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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Presenting the topic 
The catastrophic effects of nuclear weapons have been clear ever since the United 
States dropped two nuclear bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World 
War Two. At that time US was the only Nuclear Weapons State (NWS) but already 
by 1964, France, the United Kingdom, China and the Soviet Union had developed 
nuclear weapons capacity.1 Later these were joined by India, Pakistan, North Korea 
and Israel.2 The proliferation of nuclear weapons is seen as one of the most serious 
and challenging security issues of today. Not only are nuclear weapons of great 
danger if acquired by failed States, rogue nations, and military dictatorships but could 
lead to a cascade of destabilizing reactions by other nations.3 This insight has since 
the beginning of the Cold War era resulted in an extensive international cooperation 
attempting to prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons; without rendering 
more difficult the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
of 1970 constitutes the core document and contains the fundamental rules as well as 
mechanisms for handling the complicated tasks of verifying the solely peaceful 
character of Member States’ nuclear programs.  
 
In September 2009 the world was once more made aware of the existence and 
actuality of the nuclear issue. Reports of a newly discovered nuclear facility4, the 
Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, in the desert near the city of Qom again raised the 
question if the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) is in compliance with its obligations 
                                                
1 Darryl Howlett: “Nuclear Proliferation”, in John Baylis, Patricia Owens and Steve Smith (eds.): The 
Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), p. 391 
2 South Africa, having attained a nuclear weapons capability (between 1979 and 1989), became the first 
NWS to renounce its nuclear weapons possession and change into a NNWS, see Pierre Goldschmidt: 
The IAEA Safeguards System Moves Into The 21st Century, Supplement to the IAEA Bulletin, Vol.41, 
No. 4/December 1999, available at 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Magazines/Bulletin/Bull414/article8-suppl.pdf. In the case of Israel, 
the country neither denies nor confirms possession of nuclear weapons but it is widely presumed that 
Israel does possess such weapons, see Daniel Joyner: International Law and the Proliferation of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 68 
3 Washington Institute 2009 
4 A facility is defined in INFCIRC/153 (Corr.) p. 27, as ‘(i) A reactor, a critical  
facility, a conversion plant, a fabrication plant, a reprocessing plant, an isotope separation plant or a 
separate storage installation or; (ii) Any location where nuclear material in amounts greater than one  
effective kilogram is customarily used’, available at 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc153.pdf 
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under the NPT.5 In accordance with article III of the NPT Iran has concluded a 
Safeguards Agreement (SA) with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).6 
The Safeguards Agreement is the fundamental tool for implementing Member States 
commitment not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons and lays out the principles of 
how the non-proliferation commitment shall be kept and controlled. Exact details on 
safeguards application are however not treated in the Safeguards Agreement itself but 
in “Subsidiary Arrangements”, to which the Safeguards Agreement refers. The 
Subsidiary Arrangements specify, in what is commonly referred to as the “Code 3.1”, 
at what time a new facility has to be reported to the IAEA. 
 
After the discovery of Iraq’s secret nuclear program it was clear that the provision in 
the Subsidiary Arrangements concerning the declaration of new facilities was not 
effective enough and it was therefore modified in the early 1990’s.7 According to the 
IAEA Iran is bound by the revised rules in the “Revised Code 3.1” and therefore 
should have declared the Fordow facility years back in time. Iran, on the other hand, 
claims to be in full compliance with its Safeguard Agreement, considering, as the 
Iranian government argues, that Iran is not bound by the changes to the rules.8  
 
In 2003 Iran agreed to apply the revised provisions of the Subsidiary Arrangements. 
Following IAEA’s referral of Iran to the UN Security Council in 2006, Iran however 
informed the IAEA that due to a law passed by the Iranian Parliament Iran would no 
longer implement the non-ratified changes to its Subsidiary Arrangements. The IAEA 
has not accepted Iran’s position.9 Being one in a long row of conflict-issues between 
Iran and the IAEA the revelation of the Fordow facility raises important questions of 
international law and serves as point of departure for this paper. 
 
                                                
5 Iran signed the NPT in 1968 and the treaty entered into force in 1970, see 
http://disarmament2.un.org/TreatyStatus.nsf 
6 The Agreement entered into force on 15 May 1974, pursuant to its Article 25, INCIRC/214, 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc214.pdf  
7 The Board of Governors took a decision in 1992 in this regard, GOV/2003/40 paragraph 6, available 
at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-40.pdf 
8 Statement by Iran at the IAEA Board of Governors, November 2009, p. 2, INFCIRC/799, available at 
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/index.shtml 
9 GOV/INF/2007/8, available at 
http://www.pmiran.at/sts2007/GOV%20INF%20Subsidiary%20arrangement.pdf 
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1.2 Objectives  
The overall aim of the paper is to highlight one of the parts of a current international 
conflict and to provide a basis for understanding the chosen problematic from an 
international legal perspective. For this purpose international treaty law will serve as 
the main tool of analysis. In the international society there takes place a continuous 
process of legitimization where international actors appeal to norms of legality to 
legitimize their actions.10 Other ways of legitimization include applying arguments of 
morality or of necessity. The principle of auto-interpretation11 of international rights 
and obligations is still prevailing on the international scene but proving that an action 
is “legal” is thus a way of justifying it in the eyes of the international community. 
Therefore taking resort to international treaty law, more precisely the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), for the interpretation of Iran’s rights and 
obligations in its relationship to the IAEA makes sense. Being the universally 
accepted legal instrument for evaluating international treaty relationships, a 
legitimization by any of the actors involved will logically fall within the realm of the 
principles expressed in the Vienna Convention.  
 
The objective is not to say that one position is definitely right and the other is 
definitely wrong.12 With the approach to the problematic that has been chosen this is 
in any case not possible. Nevertheless a conclusion on the credibility of the opposing 
positions on the legal status of the Revised Code 3.1 in relation to Iran will be 
attempted. Arriving there, however, requires setting the problematic both in its 
legal/political as well as historical context. The objectives pursued can more precisely 
be formulated as follows:  
 
                                                
10 Ian Clark shows how States throughout history have sought to legitimize their undertakings through 
complex and intertwined practices. Interesting to note is that Clark attempts to demonstrate that the 
practice of appealing to norms itself is fundamental to normative change, Ian Clark: Legitimacy in 
International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 207 
11 This follows from the horizontal structure still largely prevailing in the international society, where 
no international actor or group of actors has the authority to impose or enforce a certain interpretation 
on any other actor, Antonio Cassese: International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 6  
12 International legal argumentation is rhetorical as much as it is logical. Therefore taking a stand in a 
question of interpretation is not the same as stating an objective truth in the matter, see Christian Reus-
Smith: “International Law” in John Baylis, Patricia Owens and Steve Smith (eds.): The Globalization 
of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 
p. 284 
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- To examine the legal and institutional framework of nuclear non-proliferation; to 
which the IAEA maintains that Iran is not fulfilling its obligations in view of the 
Revised Code 3.1.  
 
- To sort out the up-come situation and to explain the legal difficulties under 
consideration, as well as the positions of the involved actors.  
 
- To analyze the specific rules in question and elaborate on whether or not Iran can or 
can not be said to be bound by the Revised Code 3.1, using the norms and principles 
on creation and interpretation of international law, as have been formalized in the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.  
 
1.3 Theoretical approaches  
1.3.1 International Relations and International Law 
1.3.1.1 Bridging the abyss  
 
The theoretical study of international conflicts can be attempted from various angels. 
Traditionally the disciplines International Law (IL) and International Relations (IR) 
have been divided into two distinct and separate subject matters, where the one has 
been dealt with without consideration of the other. In recent times this separation has 
been increasingly challenged.13  Both IL and IR scholars have put forth the need to 
create a bridge between the two disciplines in order to make it possible, not only to 
understand, but to find ways how to truly handle the modern international reality.14 It 
is not questioned that IR and IL contain differences to one another, but held that the 
level of difference between them varies depending on the specific question asked and 
the interests behind its formulation.15 Thus, depending on the point of departure the 
                                                
13 David Armstrong, Theo Farrell and Hélène Lambert: International Law and International Relations 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 69, Başak Çali: “International law for international 
relations: foundations for interdisciplinary study”, in Başak Çali (ed.): International Law for 
International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 23  
14 Mikael Baaz: Rätt och Politik i det Internationella Samhället: Essäer och Artiklar (Stockholm: Jure 
Förlag AB, 2010, forthcoming June) 
15 Başak Çali: “International law for international relations: foundations for interdisciplinary study”, in 
Başak Çali: (ed.): International Law for International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010), p. 9 
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disciplines IL and IR might even be closer to each other than different approaches 
within the two disciplines.  In consequence, using both IL and IR theories when 
making a legal analysis of an international phenomenon is not contradictory. Rather 
the contrary; taking assistance from both camps must in many cases be necessary to 
succeed with the operation.  
 
1.3.1.2 International Relations  
 
The study of international relations has as objective to examine and explain the 
content and structure of the international system as well as why States and other 
international actors behave the way they do in that system.16 The three dominant and 
competing theories in the history of IR:  Realism, Liberalism and Marxism17 have 
been challenged, most importantly by Social Constructivism, emerging in the late 
1980’s and growing in importance ever since.18 Each providing their view of the 
world, these theories all contribute to our understanding of the processes and motives 
behind actions taken on the international plane.19  
 
As opposed to the realist view of world politics as being a struggle for power in 
accordance with national interests, the liberal tradition puts emphasis on progress and 
believes international cooperation is possible. Not only States, but also non-State 
entities are seen as taking part in the global interaction. Consequently, liberals define 
the existing world order as being a result of the interdependent relationship between 
various international actors, rather than a result of a power balance between sovereign 
States.20 Therefore liberals stress the importance of building international structures 
where cooperation is enabled, and in doing so, put fundamental weight on 
                                                
16 Başak Çali: “International law for international relations: foundations for interdisciplinary study”, in 
Başak Çali (ed.): International Law for International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010), p. 7 
17Mikael Baaz: “Human Rights or Human Wrongs? Towards a “Thin” Universal Code of International 
Human Rights for the Twenty-first Century” (Juridisk Tidskrift, 2008/2009, no 2, p. 422 
18 For a most comprehensible overview of the main IR theories as well as emerging trends see John 
Baylis, Patricia Owens and Steve Smith: “Introduction”, in John Baylis, Patricia Owens, Steve Smith 
(eds.): The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), pp. 3 f 
19 As held by Baylis, Owens and Smith, it is not possible to ignore theory and to only look at “facts”. 
Without the “simplifying device” that theories constitute, facts cannot be assessed. In this the authors 
also imply that it is not important which theory is chosen, only that it is chosen, ibid. p. 4 
20 Ibid. p. 5 
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international institutions and the rule of law.21 Out of their progressive attitude 
traditional liberals initiated the development of theoretical models for explaining 
complex and inter-linked systems of cooperation existing in the international sphere.  
 
1.3.1.3 International Law  
 
The discipline of international law puts emphasis on the norms, principles and 
practices governing the international arena; how these can be discerned and how they 
can be interpreted. Equally important is establishing the influence of international law 
and to explain why or why not international actors comply with international law.22 IL 
scholars study international institutions on different levels and with different 
theoretical approaches. The lowest level of international institutions studied is 
constituted by issue-specific institutions (regimes); a matter that will be revisited in 
the following. 
 
Built upon empirical study23 and the notion of consent the dominant theoretical 
approach in modern IL is positivist.24 Developed during the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries as a reaction to natural law, Legal Positivism sees international law as 
deriving from State’s acceptance, may it be explicit or tacit, to adhere to international 
regulation.25 Although traditional sources of law, made out by treaties and custom, 
remain the core of legal positivist’s perception of international law, an understanding 
of the normative effects of less formal mechanisms has entered the positivist scene.26 
Modern positivists also increasingly acknowledge the role of non-State actors in the 
                                                
21 Ibid. p. 119 
22 David Armstrong, Theo Farrell and Hélène Lambert: International Law and International Relations 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 4 
23 Positivists believe morality and law are two different things, and that law thus should be subject to 
scientific study, not wishful thinking, ibid. p. 77 
24Armstrong et al. International Law and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007), p. 74  
25 Natural Law again gained importance after WW II, and the inclusion of peremptory norms, jus 
cogens, in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, as well as the debated responsibility to 
protect are examples of expressions of modern natural law, see Alan Boyle and Christine Chinkin: The 
Making of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 11 ff, Mikael Baaz: 
“Statsuveränitet och Humanitär Intervention: (O)förenliga Principer i ett Globaliserat Internationellt 
Sammhälle ?” (Juridisk Tidskrift, 2009/2010, no. 4), p. 805  
26 Boyle and Chinkin: The Making of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 
12. According to Çali this development in positivism has parallels with social constructivism theories 
in IR, Çali: “Perspectives on international relations in international law”, in Çali (ed.): International 
Law for International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 77 
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making of international law.27 The emergence of other theoretical orientations such as 
Legal Process Theory28 and Legal Constructivism29 makes clear that the positivist 
approach is not unquestioned.30 Greater focus on institutions has for example shown 
how law can be created beyond the strict consent of States; clarifying how 
institutional procedures, processes and practices can fill out gaps or serve as tools for 
interpretation of existing law.31  
 
1.3.2 Regime Theory 
1.3.2.1 Defining International Regimes 
 
Born out of the liberal idea tradition, Regime Theory aims at explaining the origins, 
maintenance and consequences of international regimes. With this in view regime 
theorists have distinguished the combined use of hard- and soft law tools32 existing in 
international cooperation.33 Regimes are explained as rule-governed behaviour in 
distinct issue-areas, which can come into being either through formalized agreements 
(full-blown regime) or through the emergence of an expectation of obedience to a set 
of informal rules (tacit regime).34 One widely recognized definition of  “International 
Regimes” was put in writing by Stephan Krasner in 1983 and states that international 
regimes are:  
 
                                                
27 Boyle and Chinkin: The Making of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 43 
28 Besides of placing law in a context of broader social and political processes the theory has in part a 
prescriptive approach to IL, and has been used by the New Havens School to justify, what has been 
criticised as aggressive US power-politics, see e.g. Mikael Baaz: The Use of Force and International 
Society (Stockholm: Jure Förlag AB, 2009) 
29 Legal constructivists believe that the processes defined by legal process scholars are constitutive, 
meaning that norms play a role in forming actor’s behaviour, Armstrong et al.: International Law and 
International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 14 
30 With its many competing theories International Law has been defined as a “divided” discipline, 
which gives it something further in common with the discipline of international relations, Baaz:Rätt 
och Politik i det Internationella Samhället: Essäer och Artiklar (Stockholm: Jure Förlag AB, 2010, 
forthcoming June) 
31 Boyle and Chinkin: The Making of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 13 
32 Soft law being defined as “a variety of non-legally binding instruments used in contemporary 
international relations” such as declarations, resolutions, non-treaty agreements, practices and 
standards by organizations etc. Conversely, hard law is always legally binding and has the form of 
treaties or custom. The two categories interact and the distinction between them is far from always 
clear, see Boyle and Chinkin: The Making of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007), p. 213 
33 Being one of the important contributions of regime theory to previsions approaches. 
34 Richard Little: “International Regimes”, in Baylis et al. (eds.): The globalization of world politics: 
an introduction to international relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 301 
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Implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which 
actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of 
fact, causation and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of right and 
obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for actions. Decision-making 
procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice.35 
 
The purpose of the regime is to provide norms of behaviour that, if they are obeyed, 
result in collective outcomes that are in harmony with the principles of the regime. 
According to Krasner there are two kinds of regime changes. A change of the regime 
in itself takes place only if the principles or norms of the regime are overthrown. All 
other modifications of the content of the regime are changes within the regime.  
 
1.3.2.2 From Rationalism to Cognitivism 
 
Regimes are today recognized as important features of the contemporary international 
system but theorists disagree on how and why regimes are formed and maintained. 
The classical rationalist theories Realism and Liberalism both consider regimes as 
being a product of rational self-interested actors striving towards wealth-
maximization. The Cognitive regime theory offers a quite different approach; bringing 
forth that institutions are better understood from a sociological perspective than from 
a rational choice perspective. In the cognitive theory institutionalism is strong and 
States are rather seen as team players than wealth-maximizers. Mainstream realist and 
neo-liberal approaches are criticized for neglecting how States’ identities and 
preferences are constituted by “knowledge distribution”. Actors’ interests are not seen 
as simply “given” but as a result of a “body of knowledge in the actors possession.36 
Cognitive theory stresses that States’ interests can be redefined because of new 
knowledge changing previous opinions in a certain matter37, or a shift of normative 
ideas in the internal politics of a state.38 Arguing that social factors need to be 
                                                
35 Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger: Theories of International Regimes 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 9 
36 Ibid. p .140 
37 According to Joseph Nye the change of ideas by the Soviet and the US concerning the usability of 
nuclear weapons during the post-war period made cooperation on non-proliferation possible, ibid. p. 
147 
38 Decolonization was, as Robert Jackson argues, largely a result of a “fundamental shift of normative 
ideas” by colonizing powers on what was legitimate and illegitimate rule, and not due to a change in 
the balance of power, ibid. p. 143 
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considered for understanding regime creation and persistence, the cognitive theory 
has emerged as a valuable complement to classical approaches.39   
 
Rationalist approaches see regimes as completely dependant of the will of pre-
existing States, whereas cognitive theory holds that states are greatly influenced and 
shaped by social institution, without which rational choices would be impossible.40 
According to this line of thought international regimes have both a regulative and a 
constitutive dimension. Not only do they prescribe to States a specific behaviour 
through norms and rules, but also create a common understanding of the social world 
and the frame in which States can act.   
 
The observation by Louis Henkin that “almost all nations observe almost all 
principles of international law and almost all their obligations almost all of the time”41 
is explained by cognitivists through what Thomas Franck calls the “Power of 
Legitimacy”. Franck argues that the binding force of norms and rules is dependent of 
their degree of legitimacy42, and that if legitimate, rules exert a “compliance pull” of 
their own.43 This explains why States to a large extent respect their international 
obligations even if they have both the incentives and the capacity to break them. 
Rules not perceived as legitimate are on the other hand less likely to be observed 
voluntarily and need sanctions to be upheld.  
 
1.3.2.3 Understanding Nuclear Non-Proliferation through Regime Theory  
 
The international cooperation on the nuclear area is one of the most important security 
regimes of today. Harald Müller defines the prevention of nuclear proliferation as an 
international regime based on four main principles44:  
 
                                                
39 Christer Jönsson: “Cognitive Factors in Explaining Regime Dynamics”, in Volker Rittberger, with 
the assistance of Peter Mayer (eds.): Regime theory and International Relations (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1993), p. 203 
40  Like the rules in chess enable the players to play the game in the first place, Hasenclever et al.: 
Theories of International Regimes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 139 
41 ibid. p. 170 
42 The legitimacy of rules is according to Franck dependent of four dimensions: determinacy, symbolic 
validation, coherence and adherence, see Thomas M. Franck: The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 49 
43 Ibid. p. 24 
44 Hasenclever et al.: Theories of International Regimes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997), p. 9 
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1.  Nuclear proliferation increases the risk of a nuclear war. 
2. A multilateral non-proliferation policy is compatible with the continuation and 
spread of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.  
3. The prevention of nuclear proliferation in a long-term perspective is possible only 
if the Nuclear Weapon States are willing to reduce their nuclear arsenals. 
4. Verification is necessary to achieve the objectives of the non-proliferation regime. 
 
The principles of the non-proliferation regime are, according to Müller, defined by 
norms, of which some of the most important are: the obligation for all Non Nuclear 
Weapon States to refrain from producing or acquiring nuclear weapons, all Member 
States to refrain from assisting in such production or acquisition and the obligation 
for NWS to make serious efforts aiming at total nuclear disarmament.45 The 
fundamental norms of the regime are realized through a set of specific rules consisting 
of prescriptions or proscriptions. Important examples are the precisely detailed rules 
in relation to NNWS on nuclear verification and export control. The obligations for 
NWS are on the contrary formulated only vaguely, giving no time frame for reaching 
disarmament agreements.46  
 
The final component of the non-proliferation regime consists of a multitude of 
procedures through which the regime functions. Although the core of the non-
proliferation regime is made out of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty, the one 
cannot be taken for the other. The regime encompasses a much larger range of formal 
as well as informal documents and agreements, including the Safeguards System and 
the Additional Protocol. The non-proliferation regime is furthermore accompanied by 
the IAEA, an international organization with the purpose to represent and act on 
behalf of the regime, but distinct from the regime itself.   
 
Regime theory can be an essential tool for analyzing States’ behaviour when it comes 
to nuclear related issues. Through regime theory the legal character of the declaration 
                                                
45 See NPT art I, II, VI, INFCIRC/140, available at 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc140.pdf 
46 This is one of the major points of critic towards the non-proliferation regime. See e.g. Daniel Joyner: 
International Law and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009) 
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of the Fordow facility can be understood from a broader perspective; one where 
State’s actions are not dealt with in isolation but seen as part of a complex whole. 
 
1.3.3 The relationship between International and National Law: Monism versus 
Dualism  
Throughout the evolution of international law one of the essential questions has been 
to define its relationship to national law. The two main theoretical approaches, 
monism and dualism, oppose each other and offer States radically different options in 
dealing with international law.  
 
Developed to a complete theory by Hans Kelsen after World War I the Monistic 
doctrine sees only one unitary legal system including all legal orders on varying 
levels. The international legal order is on the top of the pyramid and prevails over 
municipal law. In case of conflict the municipal rule is invalid and disregarded in 
favour of the international norm. Within the monistic tradition the “transformation” of 
international rules into domestic law is not necessary, since they both belong to the 
same legal order. International legal rules are directly applicable and individuals are 
thus attributed with the rights and obligations of an international legal subject.47 
Admitting that most national legal systems accept international norms only after they 
have been transformed into national legislation Kelsen argued that this is a concern of 
national law and does not affect the position of international law.48 Kelsen was of the 
opinion that the primacy of international law could not be founded on legal or 
scientific considerations but is dependant of political decisions.49 The monistic theory 
has been elaborated and supported by many scholars of law but has also been 
criticized for being a merely intellectual creation, disregarding States’ sovereign and 
independent existence.50 
 
                                                
47 Antonio Cassese: International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005), p. 215 
48 Meaning that despite being in accordance with national legislation the state concerned is in breach of 
its international obligations.  
49 Eileen Denza:  “The Relationship Between International and National Law”, in Malcolm, D. Evans, 
International Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 428 
50 Ian Brownlie: Principles of Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 32 
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The Dualistic approach, to a great extent formulated by Dionisio Anzilotti in the 
beginning of the 20th century, stresses the existence of two distinct and separate 
categories of legal orders, with their own legal content, subjects and sources. 
Emphasising the differences between national and international law the dualistic 
theory does not accept a primacy of one of the legal orders over the other.51 To obtain 
legal effect in the national system international norms have to be transformed through 
domestic legislation. According to the dualistic approach international law has no 
possibility of changing or altering municipal legislation and in the case of conflict 
courts would apply national law.52 At the same time compliance to international 
norms is advocated through different forms of national implementation mechanisms.53 
Influenced by a nationalistic ideology dualism aims at guaranteeing States the 
freedom of acting in accordance with national interests in case of conflict with 
international law.  
 
Due to the fundamental principle of State sovereignty the choice between a monistic 
or a dualistic-oriented approach will largely affect a State’s behaviour in relation to 
international law. Although there are many different methods of approach and the 
division between monism and dualism in no way is clear-cut the theories give a 
fundamental understanding for the existing problematic in the relationship between 
national and international law.54 The way in which international commitments are 
created and fulfilled depends upon national standpoints and it is therefore important to 
consider the underlying ideological base from which a State acts.  
 
1.4 Method  
The overall purpose being to analyze a specific treaty question in a broader context of 
international law a legal dogmatic approach has been considered suitable.55 The aim is 
                                                
51 Antonio Cassese: International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005), p. 214 
52 Ian Brownlie: Principles of Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 33 
53 Statutory ad hoc incorporation or Automatic ad hoc incorporation, see Antonio Cassese: 
International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005), p. 221 
54 For a critical view on the applicability of the theories see Eileen Denza: “The Relationship Between 
International and National Law”, in Malcolm, D. Evans: International Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006), p. 429 
55 Although there exists a confusion around the notion of legal dogmatic the jurisprudential method 
characterized by its free argumentation and a wide range of legal theories and sources, is commonly 
    
 
Page 
16   
not to make any qualitative judgements on how actors should behave or state a 
preferred outcome in the issue. The humble ambition is rather to examine, explain and 
formulate an argumentation around the occurred situation with a legal empiric point 
of departure.56 In its consideration of a legal problem the paper simply seeks to 
include the political and theoretical context in which the law exists. 
  
Primary sources on the area of nuclear-non-proliferation, of which most importantly 
the NPT, the IAEA/Iran Safeguards Agreement and its Subsidiary Arrangements, 
constitute the basis for the legal analysis. Secondary sources in form of doctrine in the 
field of international law, reports and articles have been essential and necessary 
means for understanding and evaluating the complexities of today’s international legal 
reality. The two categories of sources should be seen as complementary to each other 
and as equally important. 
  
The IAEA homepage has been a valuable source of information, providing up to date 
legal documentation as well as in depths knowledge of the structure and content of the 
nuclear non-proliferation regime. In order to pin out the opposing positions IAEA 
reports as well as internal communication between the IAEA and Iran have been 
utilized, in so far as these have been available. As many documents concerning the 
relationship between the IAEA and its contracting parties under Safeguards 
Agreements are confidential it has at times been necessary to resort to documents 
referring to information of interest for this paper. The most obvious example is the 
Code 3.1, the provisions of which are consistently referred to both by the IAEA and 
Iran, as well as international media and international legal experts. The Code itself has 
never been published and makes out a part of the confidential Subsidiary 
Arrangements to Iran’s Safeguards Agreement. Notwithstanding, the pertinent 
provision of the Subsidiary Arrangements has been sufficiently and consistently 
reflected in other mediums, as to leave no doubt on its content.     
 
                                                                                                                                       
classified as legal dogmatic, Cleas Sandgren: Rättsvetenskap för uppsatsförfattare (Stockholm: 
Norstedts Förlag, 2007), p. 53.    
56 See Mikael Baaz: The use of Force and International Society (Stockholm: Jure Förlag AB, 2009), p. 
30 
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1.5 Disposition 
The disposition of the paper follows a chronological model where the problematic is 
treated in a successive manner, leading towards a conclusion on the same. Firstly the 
institutional and legal framework in which the disagreement between Iran and the 
IAEA has occurred will be presented. In doing so emphasis is put on the relationship 
between the different legal instruments and international actors involved in securing 
nuclear non-proliferation.  
 
Thereafter the question of the legal character of the revised Code 3.1 is systematized 
and put in a historical perspective, clarifying how the rules on nuclear verification 
have evolved and thus resulted in a conflict on their legal status. In the same line the 
specific treaty relationship between Iran and the IAEA is investigated and structured, 
and put in relation to the positions taken by the opponents, as is discerned from their 
argumentation and actions.  
 
An analysis is then undertaken where the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
is applied on the treaty relationship between Iran and the IAEA. Conclusions on how 
the opposing standpoints can be judged under the Vienna Convention follow. The 
report is ended by a more general reflection on how the outcome of the analysis can 
be assessed in relation to the perceived legitimacy-level of the non-proliferation 
regime.   
 
1.6 Delimitations  
The interest of the report is to lift out one specific question from the multitude of 
issues surrounding the nuclear program of Iran. Necessarily many separate but 
connected matters must be left aside or dealt with only superficially. One of those 
matters is what in the practice of the IAEA has been/or should be defined as formal 
non-compliance of the Safeguards Agreement, and the consequences of such a 
finding. The issue has been, and will continue to be, much debated.57 For the purpose 
                                                
57 Pierre Goldschmidt: Exposing Nuclear Non-compliance, Global Politics and Strategy, Vol. 51, No. 1, 
February-March 2009, p 149, available at 
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/goldschmidt_survival20090201.pdf 
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of the analysis of this paper it is however considered sufficient to depart from the fact 
that there exists a disagreement on the legal character of Iran’s obligations in relation 
to the Revised Code 3.1.  
 
Neither is there any intent to elaborate in a deeper manner on other parallel 
developments of the Safeguards System, most importantly the Additional Protocol; 
other than for giving a background understanding and explaining the points of contact 
with the problematic under investigation. Finally it has to be made clear that the 
ambition is not to cover all angels of international law possibly relevant. Instead the 
provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties will be applied in a 
selective manner, on the basis of what the author deems as pertinent and illuminating 
for the questions at hand.  
 
2. THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME 
2.1 The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
2.1.1 Growing nuclear awareness and the birth of the NPT 
The Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is a result of a multilateral 
process within the framework of the United Nations General Assembly. Starting out 
with a draft resolution proposed by Ireland at the 13th session of the General 
Assembly in 1958, the NPT could ten years later open for signature on the 1 July 
1968. The 5 March 1970 the Treaty entered into force, when, in accordance with 
article IX.3, the three Depository Governments of the United Kingdom, United States 
and the Russian Federation, as well as 40 other States had deposited their instruments 
of ratification.58 In 1995 the majority of the parties to the Treaty took a decision that 
the NPT shall continue in force indefinitely.59 Furthermore the NPT foresees a 
mechanism of conferences to be held every five years in view of assuring that the 
                                                
58 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Notification of the entry into force, 
INFCIRC/140, 22 April 1970, available at 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc140.pdf 
59 The decision was taken as previewed in accordance to article IX.6 NPT, David Fischer: History of 
the International Atomic Energy, The First Forty Years, Division of Publications International Atomic 
Energy Agency, Vienna, 1997, p. 11, available at http://www-
pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1032_web.pdf 
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objectives of the Treaty are being realized.60 Today, forty years after its entry into 
force the NPT has a membership of nearly 190 States and remains, despite much 
criticism, the fundamental legal instrument in the efforts towards the non-proliferation 
of nuclear weapons.61 
 
2.1.2 Differentiated and reciprocal rights and obligations under the NPT  
The NPT contains two groups of actors, both of which attributed with a distinct set of 
rights and obligations. The one group, consisting of States already in possession of 
nuclear weapons (Nuclear Weapon States)62 at the time of conclusion of the Treaty 
committed, in article I NPT, not to spread those weapons or the technology to obtain 
such weapons to States not yet in possession of nuclear weapons (Non Nuclear 
Weapon States).63 Furthermore, as is spelt out in article VI NPT, the Nuclear Weapon 
States (NWS) agreed to take upon themselves an obligation to “peruse negotiations in 
good faith” towards disarmament of their own nuclear programs, as well as towards 
global disarmament under multilateral control.64  
 
The Non Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS), on the other hand, undertook in article II 
of the Treaty, not to acquire nuclear weapons or to attempt to manufacture such 
weapons on their own.65 The reason why NNWS accepted such an unequal legal 
position has been referred to as the “grand bargain” of the NPT and entails the 
exchange of the right to nuclear weapons against the recognition of the right to 
nuclear technology for civilian purposes, and importantly, the technical assistance for 
obtaining such technology.66 The NWS67 are thus obliged, under the NPT, to 
positively support NNWS in their development of nuclear programs for peaceful 
                                                
60 Article VIII.3 NPT. The most recent review conference was held in May 2010. The 2005 conference 
was largely seen as a disaster and no agreement was reached, see Michel Richard: “The New 
Challenges to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime”, in Rudolf Avenhaus, Nicholas Kyriakopoulos, 
Michel Richard and Gotthard Stein (Eds.): Verifying Treaty Compliance, Limiting Weapons of mass 
Destruction and Monitoring Koyoto Protocol Provisions (Berlin: Springer, 2006), p. 270 
61 Daniel Joyner: International Law and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 8 
62 Article IX.3 NPT defines a Nuclear Weapon States as a State “which has manufactured and exploded 
a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January, 1967” 
63 Article I NPT, INFCIRC/140 
64 Article VI NPT, INFCIRC/140 
65 Article II NPT, INFCIRC/140 
66 Joyner: International Law and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), p. 9 
67 Including NNWS with such technology, see article IV NPT 
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purposes.68 The “inalienable” right of the NNWS to nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes was however conditioned in such a way that its exercise must be in 
conformity with articles I and II of the Treaty.  
 
2.1.3 Controlling NPT compliance  
For the purpose of securing that NNWS are in compliance with their commitment not 
to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons article III of the NPT was constructed to 
hold an obligation for all NNWS to conclude bilateral Safeguards Agreements with an 
independent controlling body and to apply export controls on specified materials. The 
control mechanism foreseen in article III gave a mandate for the already existing 
International Atomic Energy Agency to monitor the nuclear programs of NNWS in 
order to verify the non-diversion of nuclear materials. The very essence of accepting 
such a control mechanism was to demonstrate a transparency and create trust in 
NNWS’ exclusively peaceful nuclear activities.69 
 
2.2 The International Atomic Energy Agency and its role as guardian of the NPT 
2.2.1 An Agency with dual objectives: promoting peace through nuclear energy and 
preventing war through nuclear weapons 
The IAEA is an autonomous intergovernmental body that was created in 1957 as the 
world’s Atoms for Peace Organization with the purpose to meet the growing fear of 
an uncontrolled spread of nuclear weapons technology.70 The proposition to establish 
an international organisation for this end was first addressed by President Eisenhower 
in a speech before the General Assembly of the United Nations on the 8th of 
December 1953.71 The essence of his discourse was then elaborated upon by 
diplomats, scientists, experts and politicians and founded what in October 1956 was 
                                                
68 Article IV NPT obliges “all the Parties to the Treaty” to engage in technical assistance, meaning that 
even NNWS with sufficient nuclear recourses are included.  
69 Pierre Goldschmidt: The IAEA Safeguards System Moves Into the 21st Century, Supplement to IAEA 
Bulletin, Vol. 41, No. 4/December 1999, Vienna 1999, p. 1, available at 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Magazines/Bulletin/Bull414/article8-suppl.pdf 
70 THEN&NOW THE IAEA TURNS FORTY, IAEA Bulletin 39/3/1997, Vienna, 1997, p. 2, available at 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Magazines/Bulletin/Bull393/bull393opt.pdf 
71 David Fischer: History of the International Atomic Energy, The First Forty Years, Division of 
Publications International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, 1997, p. 9 
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unanimously adopted by the General Assembly as the Statute of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency.72 Article II of the Statute states the Objectives of the Agency: 
 
The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, 
health and prosperity throughout the world. It shall ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance 
provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to 
further any military purpose. 
 
The idea behind the structure and functions of the IAEA was to establish a pool of 
nuclear resources and technologies under collective control and administrated by an 
independent body. Member States were to profit from the gathered recourses and 
were obliged to accept IAEA safeguards and safety standards on their nuclear 
activities only if they received assistance from the IAEA. First with the entry into 
force of the NPT, Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA became mandatory to all 
Non Nuclear Weapon Member States.  
 
The IAEA thus predates the NPT with eleven years and holds in its Statute a wide 
range of responsibilities and functions on the atomic energy area that were developed 
freestanding from the NPT.73 Today however, the IAEA is know worldwide primarily 
for its role as watchdog over the NPT Safeguards Agreements concluded with 
NNWS.74 The relationship between the NPT and the IAEA aims at making possible 
what has been called the Janus Face of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.75 The twin 
mandate of the IAEA is supposed to enable States not in possession of nuclear energy 
to obtain necessary technology and materials to benefit from the “peaceful atom”, and 
to assure the international community that the proliferation of nuclear weapons is 
halted. 
 
                                                
72 Stressing the need for global disarmament in his speech, the US nuclear arsenal nevertheless grew 
under Mr. Eisenhower’s Presidency, as did those of the Soviet Union, See Richard G. Hewlett and Jack 
M. Holl: Atoms for Peace and War: 1953–1961, Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission 
(Berkley: University of California Press, 1989), p. 272. 
73 Article III of the Statute lists the functions of the IAEA, including: to encourage and assist research 
on atomic energy for peaceful purposes, to foster the exchange of scientific and technical information 
and training, to establish and monitor safety standards. The functions of the IAEA form three main 
pillars: Safety, Security and Technical Assistance, available at http://www.iaea.org/About/statute.html 
74 Joyner: International Law and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), p. 19 
75 Shahram Chubin: Iran’s nuclear Ambitions (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 2006), p. 5   
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2.2.2 The Governing Bodies of the IAEA 
The IAEA has two policy-making organs: the General Conference and the Board of 
Governors (BoG). The General Conference represents all Member States whereas the 
Board of Governors holds only 35 seats. The IAEA also has a Director General who 
is the head of the Secretariat and responsible for implementing the Agency’s 
program.76 The division of power in the IAEA differs quite significantly from other 
UN-related organizations, the executive power being strongly concentrated to the 
Board of Governors and not to the forum where all Member States are represented, 
namely the General Conference.77  
 
As follows of the IAEA Statute, the Board of Governors has the exclusive power in 
almost all matters concerning safeguards, including the power to negotiate and 
conclude Safeguards Agreements as well as to determine if a Member State is in 
breach of its obligations under such an agreement. The Board is to report findings of a 
breach directly to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations, 
thus without consulting the General Conference.78 The power of the Board is further 
shown by the position of the Director General who “shall be under the authority of 
and subject to the control of the Board of Governors… [and] shall perform his duties 
in accordance with regulations adopted by the Board”.79 
 
The Board of Governors meets five times a year and, in addition to its safeguards-
responsibility, prepares the programme and budget of the Agency, as well as 
considers new memberships and designates the Director General. The General 
Conference meets once a year and has amongst its competences to approve the 
budget, membership applications and the appointment of a new Director General. The 
power of the General Conference is however limited to returning a proposal to the 
                                                
76 The current Director General Yukiya Amano took office in December 2009 according to the 
procedure laid out in article VII.A of the Statute. Before him the Nobel Prize winner Mohamed 
ElBaradei was the IAEA Director General for 12 years, http://www.iaea.org/About/dg/former_dgs.html 
77 David Fischer: History of the International Atomic Energy, The First Forty Years, Division of 
Publications International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, 1997, p. 37 
78 Article XII.C, available at http://www.iaea.org/About/statute.html 
79 Article VII.B 
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Board of Governors for new consideration and can thus not change Board 
recommendations.80    
 
2.2.3 The composition of the Board of Governors 
Due to the significant power attributed to the Board of Governors the procedure for 
designating its 35 members was subject to much attention during the creation of the 
IAEA Statute. The version finally approved is complex and divides the Board seats 
between different regions of the world, and with regards to the technology level of 
Member States in the nuclear field. Article VI of the Statute holds that the outgoing 
Board shall designate the ten most advanced members independent of geographic 
location and another three members, each of which is the most advanced in a region 
not represented by the first ten members.81 Originally, in 1956, the number of 
members selected in the first group was only five and the procedure was clearly 
designated to guarantee more or less permanent seats to certain Member States.82 
Time has also shown that all States who were selected this way in 1956 have been 
able to retain their seats and are Board members today.83 The remaining 22 members 
of the Board are selected by the General Conference on the basis of equitable 
geographic representation. These members rotate and are selected for periods of two 
years.84 
 
2.3 The relationship with the United Nations Security Council  
2.3.1 A three-part relation: NPT-IAEA-UNSC 
The link between the NPT and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) goes via 
the IAEA and its mandate to monitor and control Safeguards Agreements as enjoined 
in article III.1 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. As an independent international 
organization the IAEA is related to the United Nations system through a special 
                                                
80 See for example the provision on the budget procedure, article V.E.5 IAEA Statute 
81 The regions given in article VI are: North America, Latin America, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, 
Africa, Middle East and South Asia, South East Asia and the Pacific, Far East. 
82 Members of group one were in 1956: the USA, the United Kingdom, France, USSR and Canada.  
83 For the composition of the current Board of Governors see 
http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/Board/index.html 
84 Article VI.A.2 IAEA Statute 
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agreement that has been concluded in accordance with article XVI of the IAEA 
Statute.85 The statute furthermore entails two explicit provisions connecting the body 
of rules under the NPT with the Security Council. Firstly article III.B.4 states a 
general recognition of the Security Council as being the “principal organ for the 
maintenance of international peace and security” wherefore the IAEA, when 
appropriate, accepts the obligation to notify the Security Council on matters falling 
“within the competence of the Security Council”.  The second provision explicitly 
regards the prohibition for NNWS to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons under 
article II NPT. However, the IAEA Statute limits the power of the IAEA to determine 
non-compliance to the Safeguards Agreements, and the IAEA thus has no authority to 
determine breaches to the underlying NPT obligations.86 The task of the IAEA is to 
verify NPT compliance through Safeguards Agreements but the power to define and 
react upon NPT non-compliance is reserved the UNSC.87 Article XII. C of the IAEA 
Statute simply lays out the circumstances and the procedure for when a NNWS shall 
be reported to the Security Council.  
 
2.3.2 The definition and consequences of a non-compliance to Safeguards Agreements  
The procedure in article XII.C prescribes IAEA inspectors to report what they 
consider being a non-compliance of the Safeguards Agreement to the Director 
General of the Agency, who then on his part shall transmit the issue to the Board of 
Governors. If the Board of Governors formally finds that there has indeed occurred a 
non-compliance it shall be reported to all Member States and to the Security Council 
and the General Assembly of the United Nations. According to the IAEA Statute it is 
necessary that the Board of Governors reach its own conclusion that the facts reported 
by the inspectors constitute a non-compliance.88 The mandate of the IAEA to notify 
                                                
85 INFCIRC/11, available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc11.pdf 
86Joyner: International Law and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), p. 267 
87 The IAEA however has a limited scope of manoeuvre in that the Agency can suspend or terminate 
assistance and withdraw any materials and equipment made available by the Agency or a member if 
corrective steps are not taken within reasonable time by the State in breach of its Safeguards 
Agreement, Article XII.C. 7 IAEA Statute 
88 The obligation of the BoG stems from the wording in Article XII.C clearly states that speaks of  “any 
non-compliance which it finds [the BoG] to have occurred” (emphasis added), see Goldschmidt: Rule 
of Law, Politics and Nuclear Nonproliferation, Presentation to the International School of Nuclear Law 
at the University of Montpellier in France, Session 2007, available at 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=19564 
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the SC is however not dependant of the finding of a non-compliance strictu sensu but 
arises as soon as occurs a situation that “falls within the competence of the Security 
Council”. 89 Upon a referral, it is in the hands of the Security Council to take those 
actions deemed necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security, as 
foreseen in Chapter VII of the UN Charter.  
 
At the creation of the IAEA there were divided opinions between different groups of 
States on how great a role the United Nations should have in the work of the IAEA. 
Developing countries wanted a strong connection to the UN, preferably to the General 
Assembly, as a guarantee that their interests would not be completely overseen due to 
the strong power concentration to the Board of Governors, and the way the latter is 
constituted. For the Soviet Union the incentive to attribute power to the UNSC was to 
assure its veto power against potential anti Soviet actions by the West.90 The West 
lastly wanted an IAEA with as much autonomy as possible in order to avoid any 
“politicization” of the organisation. 91 
 
3. THE NON-PROLIFERATION SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM 
3.1 Early provisions for the verification of nuclear activities 
3.1.1 Background to IAEA control measures  
From its creation the IAEA has employed some sort of safeguards in connection to its 
purpose of spreading the “peaceful atom”. The safeguards regime is to a great extent 
made out of legal documents but also includes the decisions, interpretations and 
practices of the Board of Governors.92 The Statute of the IAEA provides the legal 
authority of the Agency and was drafted in a way to enable increased responsibility 
                                                
89 The competence of the SC includes all threats or potential threats to international peace and security, 
see article 24 of the UN Charter, available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter5.shtml 
90 Primarily the US, UK, France, Belgium, Portugal, Australia and South Africa, Fischer: History of the 
International Atomic Energy, The First Forty Years, Division of Publications International Atomic 
Energy Agency, Vienna, 1997, p. 45 
91 Ibid.  
92 Laura Rockwood: Legal Instruments Related to the Application of the Safeguards, IAEA/OPANAL 
Seminar, Jamaica, 1996, available at http://www.opanal.org/Articles/Jamaica/jam-Rockwood.htm 
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and growth for its verification role.93 The earliest formalized version of the system 
was defined by the mid 1960’s in document INFCIRC/66 and gave the Agency a 
limited authority to conduct verification measures, including only certain nuclear fuel 
cycle activities and only on voluntary basis, or in relation to State-recipients of 
technical assistance.94  
 
With the conclusion of the NPT in 1968 and the new role attributed to the IAEA it 
became clear that a more extensive safeguards system was necessary.95 The 
Comprehensive Safeguards System that was envisaged should include the whole 
nuclear fuel cycle, all nuclear materials and all nuclear facilities in the State in 
question.  Two years after the coming into force of the NPT the new verification 
regime of the IAEA was established in document INFCIRC/153, named The Structure 
and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States Required in Connection 
With the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.96 Today all 
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements concluded bilaterally between NNWS and 
the Agency pursuant to article III of the NPT are based on the model document 
INFCIRC/153.97 
 
3.1.2 Subsidiary Arrangements to the Safeguards Agreement 
Safeguards Agreements concluded with NPT Member States aim at clarifying the 
Member States’ obligations under the NPT on a practical level, and lay out how the 
fulfilment of these obligations shall be verified. Safeguards Agreements based on 
INFCIRC/153 are however not exhaustive in their formulation but refer to Subsidiary 
Arrangements for the precise regulation of certain questions.98 The obligation to give 
the IAEA information on existing, as well as on planned nuclear facilities is defined 
in the Code 3.1 of the General Part of the Subsidiary Arrangements. The provision of 
                                                
93 Article III.A.5 gives the Agency the authority to apply safeguards, see also Laura Rockwood: Legal 
Instruments Related to the Application of the Safeguards, IAEA/OPANAL Seminar, Jamaica, 1996 
94 The three non-NPT members India, Pakistan and Israel have concluded type INFCIRC/66 
agreements with the IAEA, see Latest Status of Safeguards Agreements & Additional Protocols, 
available at http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sv.html 
95 Ben Sanders: IAEA Safeguards and the NPT, Disarmament Forum, THE 2005 NPT REVIEW 
CONFERENCE, 2004, p. 45, available at http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2189.pdf 
96 INFCIRC/153 [corrected], www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc153.pdf  
97 The Safeguards System of the International Atomic Energy Agency, available at 
http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/about.html 
98 Article 39, INFCIRC/153, www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc153.pdf 
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such information, termed Design Information is no doubt one of the most essential 
issues dealt with in Subsidiary Arrangements; and crucial in order for the IAEA to 
keep track of NNWS nuclear programs. Subsidiary Arrangements are concluded 
individually with Member States but largely follow a standard model developed in 
connection with the development of the standard documents for Safeguards 
Agreements.99  
 
3.1.3 The Iraqi conflict and the realization of the shortcomings of INFCIRC/153 
In the early 1990’s once again concerns were raised as to the efficiency of the IAEA 
Safeguards System and the conclusion was that INFCIRC/153 had failed as an 
adequate instrument for the detection of nuclear proliferation. In 1991 it was revealed 
that the NPT Member State Iraq, outwardly in full compliance with its Safeguards 
Agreement, had managed to secretly develop a wide-ranging nuclear program without 
the knowledge of the IAEA.100 Two years later North Korea’s refusal to give access to 
the IAEA inspectors reinforced the need for change.101  
 
It was widely understood that the fundamental lack of the INFCIRC/153 provisions is 
that the system is designed to verify only the correctness of the signatory State’s 
declarations on its nuclear activities but not the completeness of these declarations.102  
In other words, the Agency has under INFCIRC/153 the authority only to verify if the 
declared materials in NNWS civil nuclear programs are not diverted to military use, 
but has no authority to control if there exists any undeclared nuclear activity in the 
State concerned. In addition to the fundamental aspect of completeness, it was 
deemed crucial to make substantial changes to the provisions on the time frame for 
providing design information. The legislation contained generally in Member States’ 
Subsidiary Arrangements at the time of the crisis in Iraq and North Korea was judged 
                                                
99 See The Evolution of IAEA Safeguards, International Nuclear Verification Series, No. 2, IAEA, 
Vienna, 1998, p. 44, available at http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/NVS2_web.pdf 
and Rockwood: Legal Instruments Related to the Application of the Safeguards, IAEA/OPANAL 
Seminar, Jamaica, 1996, paragraph V 
100 The Iraqi program included some 30 facilities, a staff of 20 000 people and amounting to between 
10 and 15 billion dollars, see Chen Zak: Iran’s Nuclear Policy and the IAEA: An Evaluation of 
Program 93+2 (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2002), p. 5 
101 Zak: Iran’s Nuclear Policy and the IAEA: An Evaluation of Program 93+2 (Washington: The 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2002), p. xi 
102Goldschmidt: The IAEA Safeguards System Moves Into The 21st Century, Supplement to the IAEA 
Bulletin, Vol.41, No. 4/December 1999, p. 3  
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to leave a much too large scope of manoeuvre for Member States to engage in 
clandestine activities.  
3. 2 Program 93+2 and updated provisions on design information  
3.2.1 Introduction 
During the 1990’s the IAEA Safeguards System underwent a significant overview and 
resulted in two sets of substantial changes of rules, through distinct procedures and 
based on different legal foundations. The two sets of changes make out Part I and Part 
II of what has been called “Program 93+2”.103 The conclusion made concerning Part I 
changes was that such changes could be made within the already existing legal 
mandate attributed to the IAEA by Member State’s Safeguards Agreements in force. 
Because of their legal character, the changes with regards to design information, 
resulting in the “Revised Code 3.1”, constitute one of the components of Part 1 of 
Program 93+2.104  
 
The second part of the Program 93+2, containing the substantially most important 
changes, could however not be introduced through existing Safeguards Agreements 
based on INFCIRC/153 but necessitated an enlarged legal fundament, resting on a 
new document which would be added to INFRIC/153 and apply parallelly.105 The 
result of Part II of “Program 93+2” was the bringing online of the Additional 
Protocol, or document INFCIRC/540. Adopted by the Board of Governors in 1997, 
the Additional Protocol largely extends the scope of the Safeguards System and 
provides for information and access to all aspects of a State’s nuclear program (not 
only those declared) and the necessary administrative underpinning for its 
enforcement.106 The enlarged authority under the Additional Protocol provides the 
necessary tool for enabling the Agency to give credible assurance of the absence of 
                                                
103 The process of enlarging the authority of the IAEA and bringing into force measures under existing 
mandate began internally within the IAEA in 1993 and was expected to come to a conclusion two years 
later, Zak: Iran’s Nuclear Policy and the IAEA: An Evaluation of Program 93+2 (Washington: The 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2002), p. 12 
104 Other Part I changes include environmental sampling, remote monitoring, unannounced inspections, 
expanded declarations etc, ibid. pp. 23-24 
105 Ibid. p. 12 
106 Jill N. Cooley: “IAEA Safeguards under the NPT: Challenges in Implementation” in Rudolf 
Avenhaus, Nicholas Kyriakopoulos, Michel Richard and Gotthard Stein (eds.): Verifying Treaty 
Compliance, Limiting Weapons of Mass Destruction and Monitoring Koyoto Protocol Provisions 
(Berlin: Springer, 2006), p. 62 
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undeclared nuclear activities.107 Entry into force of the Additional Protocol however 
requires ratification108 by Member States, and this has to this day not been undertaken 
by Iran.109  
 
3.2.2 Part I of Program 93+2: revising Code 3.1  
The recommendation on measures to be advanced under existing Safeguards 
Agreements, including the modification of Code 3.1, was taken through a decision by 
the IAEA Board of Governors on the 26 of February 1992.110 In its decision the Board 
affirmed that in order to create confidence in the peaceful purpose of a facility and to 
give enough time for safeguards preparations it is necessary that design information is 
provided already  “at the time of the decision to construct or to authorise the 
construction” of a new facility.111 In doing so the Board interpreted in a new manner 
article 42 of INFCIRC/153, which states that design information shall be provided “as 
soon as possible before nuclear material is introduced in a new facility”.112 The new 
interpretation significantly changed the substance of the provision, which in its 
original interpretation, as put down in all Subsidiary Arrangements concluded before 
that date, only required a declaration 180 days before the introduction of uranium into 
the facility.113  
 
The IAEA Secretariat had been asked to examine the necessary legal, technical and 
financial requirements for the implementation of the Board recommendations. 
Concerning the legal aspect it was understood that the implementation of Part I 
measures is conditioned by Member States’ decision to incorporate them into their 
own Safeguards Agreement, or in the case of the Code 3.1 into the Subsidiary 
                                                
107 The Safeguards System of the International Atomic Energy Agency, p. 2, see 
http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/about.html 
108 Article 17 INFCIRC/540, see 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1997/infcirc540c.pdf 
109 Iran signed the Additional Protocol in December 2003 but has never ratified it. Iran implemented 
the protocol voluntarily until 2006, see Paul K. Kerr: Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance 
with International Obligations, Congressional Research Service, December 10, 2009, p. 3, available at 
http://www.crs.gov 
110 GOV/2554/attachement2/rev.2, April 1992, see Rockwood: Legal Instruments Related to the 
Application of the Safeguards, IAEA/OPANAL Seminar, Jamaica, 1996, paragraph I.6 
111 GOV/2003/40 para.15, available at 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-40.pdf 
112 Article 42, INFCIRC/153, ibid. 
113 GOV/2007/22 para. 3, available at 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2007/gov2007-22.pdf 
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Arrangements to their Safeguards Agreement.114  In this view the decision of the 
Board of Governors from 1992 entailed a request for the Secretariat to start 
negotiating individually with Member States in order to bring about the desired 
changes.115   
 
4. IRAN AND THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME 
4.1 Treaties and agreements concluded by Iran  
4.1.1 Ratification of the NPT and Safeguards Agreements (SA) 
Iran signed the NPT in 1968 and the Treaty was ratified and entered into force in 
March 1970.116 Fulfilling article III of the NPT, a Safeguards Agreement was 
thereafter concluded between the IAEA and Iran.117 Pursuant to its article 25 SA, the 
Safeguards Agreement would enter into force when Iran’s statutory and constitutional 
requirements had been met.118 The Constitution of Iran requires in article 77 that 
international treaties are approved by the Islamic Consultative Assembly, known as 
the Majles.119 In May 1974 such approval by the Majles was notified to the IAEA and 
the Safeguards Agreement entered into force. Both the NPT and the Safeguards 
Agreement thus needed ratification in order to become binding upon Iran. The 
Safeguards Agreement gives the IAEA the right and the obligation to make sure that 
safeguards are applied on Iran’s nuclear activities, for the exclusive purpose of 
verifying that no material used in Iran’s peaceful nuclear program is diverted into 
nuclear weapons.120 Like those of most Member States’, Iran’s Safeguards Agreement 
is of the Comprehensive type, meaning that all nuclear activity and all nuclear 
materials in Iran are covered.121 
                                                
114 Zak: Iran’s Nuclear Policy and the IAEA: An Evaluation of Program 93+2 (Washington: The 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2002), p. 22 
115 GOV/2554/attachement2/rev.2, April 1992, see Laura Rockwood: Legal Instruments Related to the 
Application of the Safeguards, IAEA/OPANAL Seminar, Jamaica, 1996, paragraph I.6  
116 http://disarmament2.un.org/TreatyStatus.nsf 
117 Contained in document INFCIRC/214 and based on the standard INFCIRC/153 (corr.), available at 
www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc214.pdf 
118 INFCIRC/214 art 25  
119 See Iran Chamber Society for the text of the Iranian constitution, 
http://www.iranchamber.com/government/constitutions/constitution_ch06.php 
120 INFCIRC/214 art 2  
121 The Safeguards System of the International Atomic Energy Agency, available at 
http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/index.html 
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4.1.2 Conclusion of Subsidiary Arrangements on design information 
The obligation of Iran to provide information on its nuclear facilities has its 
foundation in the Safeguards Agreement but is regulated in detail in its Subsidiary 
Arrangements. Article 8 SA holds that the Government of Iran must provide the 
Agency with information concerning nuclear material and the features of facilities 
relevant to safeguarding such material. How this information shall be provided is 
specified in Part II of the Safeguards Agreement, where the conclusion and content of 
Subsidiary Arrangements is regulated. Article 39 SA states that Subsidiary 
Arrangements shall be concluded between Iran and the IAEA in order to permit the 
Agency to fulfil its responsibilities under the Agreement in an effective and efficient 
manner: The legal basis of the obligation to declare a new nuclear facility to the 
IAEA, in other terms to provide design information, is found in article 42 SA:   
 
The time limits for the provision of design information in respect of new facilities shall be 
specified in Subsidiary Arrangements and such information shall be provided as early as 
possible before nuclear material is introduced into a new facility.122 
 
Subsidiary Arrangements between Iran and the IAEA were concluded in 1976.123 The 
1976 General Part of Iran’s Subsidiary Arrangements, Code 3.1, calls upon Iran to 
provide design information on a new facility to the IAEA “no later than 180 days 
before the introduction of nuclear material into the facility”124, as was standard text 
until the revision of the Subsidiary Arrangements in 1992. The modified version of 
the Subsidiary Arrangements, Revised Code 3.1 requires, as we have seen, that a new 
facility is declared already when the decision to construct, or to authorize a 
construction of a new facility is taken.125  
 
                                                
122 Italics added 
123 GOV/INF/2007/8, see www.pmiran.at/sts2007/GOV%20INF%20Subsidiary%20arrangement.pdf 
124 GOV/2003/40 para.15 
125 See above at 3.2.3 
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4.2 Amendments and modifications to Subsidiary Arrangements 
4.2.1 Procedures for the entry into force of Subsidiary Arrangements  
Pursuant to article 40 SA, Iran’s Subsidiary Arrangements shall enter into force “at 
the same time or as soon as possible after” the entry into force of the Safeguards 
Agreement. Unlike the regulation in article 25 SA on the entry into force of the 
Safeguards Agreement, there exists no provision clarifying the procedure for the entry 
into force of Subsidiary Arrangements. In practice the content of the Subsidiary 
Arrangements is established through a process of negotiations conducted in meetings 
as well as in writing between the IAEA Secretariat and the Member State. Standard 
procedure then holds that the final agreement is reflected in an exchange of letters.126 
The objective of the Subsidiary Arrangements is to permit flexibility to the regulation, 
making it possible to take into account specific circumstances and technical 
differences of individual States. In this context a formal process was not deemed 
desirable for the conclusion of Subsidiary Arrangements.  
 
4.2.2 Procedures for amending or modifying Subsidiary Arrangements  
Iran’s Safeguards Agreement includes some provisions on how changes to the legal 
relationship between the IAEA and Iran on the area of safeguards are to be made. 
According to article 24 SA all amendments of the Safeguards Agreement require the 
consent of both parties. Furthermore the entry into force of amendments is 
conditioned by the same requirements as the Safeguards Agreement itself. This means 
that the Treaty foresees a ratification procedure for amendments, if so is required by 
the contracting party.127  
 
Changes in the Subsidiary Arrangements are however not seen by the Treaty-text as 
amendments of the Safeguards Agreement and thus do not fall under the provisions 
on amendments. Article 39 SA provides that “The Subsidiary Arrangements may be 
extended or changed by agreement between the Government of Iran and the Agency 
                                                
126 Rockwood: Legal Instruments Related to the Application of the Safeguards, IAEA/OPANAL 
Seminar, Jamaica, 1996, paragraph V 
127 INFCIRC/214 art. 25 
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without amendment of this Agreement”. 128 The Safeguards Agreement does not entail 
any formal procedure on the entry into force of modifications to the Subsidiary 
Arrangements. In the same way as for conclusion of Subsidiary Arrangements, the 
way of agreeing on modifications is ruled by the internal IAEA practice consisting of 
an exchange of letters between the IAEA and the contracting party.129 Since 
Subsidiary Arrangements are confidential papers,130 and therefore not published by the 
IAEA, it is however not possible to verify if all Subsidiary Arrangements have been 
concluded or modified in this manner.  
 
4.2 The Revised Code 3.1 in relation to Iran  
4.2.1 Iran’s acceptance and subsequent rejection of the modifications to its 
Subsidiary Arrangements  
Between the years 1976 and 2003 Iran’s obligations to declare new facilities were 
indisputably ruled by the original version of the Subsidiary Arrangements, since Iran 
had never agreed to the revised text requested by the IAEA Board of Governors in 
1992.131 In a letter dated the 26. February 2003 Iran however informed the IAEA that 
Iran accepted the revised version and now would start providing design information in 
accordance with the new rules.132 Iran’s decision came not long after the Iranian 
opposition group The National Council of Resistance of Iran hade made public the 
existence of two undeclared nuclear facilities in Iran.133 The announcement and proof 
                                                
128 Italics added 
129 See Goldschmidt: Concrete Steps to Improve the Nonproliferation Regime, Carnegie Endowment 
For International Peace, No. 100, April 2009, p 3, available at 
http://www.carnegieeurope.eu/publications/?fa=22943, and James, M. Acton: Iran Violated 
International Obligations on Qom Facility, Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, 25 
September 2009, available at 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=23884 
130 See The Evolution of IAEA Safeguards, International Nuclear Verification Series, No. 2, IAEA, 
Vienna, 1998, p. 44, available at http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/NVS2_web.pdf 
and Rockwood: Legal Instruments Related to the Application of the Safeguards, IAEA/OPANAL 
Seminar, Jamaica, 1996, paragraph V 
131 The Board decision is reproduced in GOV/2554/Attachment2/Rev.2 (1 April 1992), see 
Goldschmidt: The IAEA Safeguards System Moves Into The 21st Century, Supplement to the IAEA 
Bulletin, Vol.41, No. 4/December 1999, available at 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Magazines/Bulletin/Bull414/article8-suppl.pdf 
132 GOV/2003/40 para. 6 
133 Paul, K. Kerr: Iran’s Nuclear Program: Status Congressional Research Service, Sept. 18, 2009, p 4, 
available at http://www.crs.gov 
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presented by the opposition group for the first time made the international community 
aware of the scope of Iran’s nuclear program; revealing that uranium enrichment and 
plutonium separation had been concealed from the IAEA for 18 years.134 Extensive 
pressure on Iran followed and the acceptance to apply the Revised Code 3.1 was one 
of several confidence-building measures Iran consented to during 2003.135  
 
After more than three years of investigations and efforts of negotiation Iran was in 
February 2006136 referred by the IAEA Board of Governors to the UN Security 
Council, and in July 2006 the Security Council adopted its first resolution requiring 
Iran to suspend all uranium enrichment activities.137 As a response to the referral to 
the Security Council and the treatment of the Iranian dossier in the Security Council 
Iran notified the IAEA in March 2007 by letter that the Revised Code 3.1 would no 
longer be implemented.138  
 
4.2.2 The position of Iran 
The letter from Iran, dated the 29. March 2007, entails Iran’s reasons for withdrawing 
from the Revised Code 3.1. After asserting that both the referral to, and the 
resolutions by the Security Council constitute breaches of international law139 the 
letter announced that: 
 
As long as the full implementation of the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 
specifically achieving the inalienable rights stipulated in Article IV of the Treaty and the 
cessation of perusing Iran’s nuclear dossier with the United Nations Security Council, its full 
                                                
134Joyner: International Law and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), p. 50  
135 In 2003 Iran importantly agreed to sign and implement the Additional Protocol pending ratification, 
Iran: Is There a Way Out of the Nuclear Impasse? International Crisis Group, Middle East Report  
N° 51, 23 February 2006, p 1, available at http://www.crisisgroup.org 
136 The IAEA Board of Governors had already threatened to refer Iran to the SC in a resolution from 
September 2005 (GOV/2005/77) but since the BoG never “requested” the Director General to report to 
the SC the matter was put on hold. First in the resolution from February 2006 (GOV/2006/14) such a 
request was made.    
137 Resolution 1696 (July 2006) is the first out of five resolutions by the UNSC concerning Iran’s 
nuclear program. Resolutions 1737 (December 2006), 1747 (March 2007), 1803 (March 2008) and 
1835 (September 2008) were subsequently adopted. The resolutions are available at 
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/index.shtml.   
138 Iran’s letter to the IAEA is attached to GOV/INF/2007/8, available at 
www.pmiran.at/sts2007/GOV%20INF%20Subsidiary%20arrangement.pdf 
139 The referral to the UNSC being a breach oh the NPT and article XII of the IAEA statute, and the 
UNSC resolution being contrary to the UN charter, articles 1 and 3 
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disengagement, and thus the return of the dossier to the framework of the IAEA, in full, is not 
realized; and as long as potential military adventures are not removed from the table and threats 
to Iran’s security are not eliminated, further implementation of the modified code 3.1 of the 
Subsidiary Arrangements to the Safeguards Agreement, accepted in 2003, but not yet ratified by 
the parliament, aimed at enhancing Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA, shall be suspended and 
Iran reverts to implement the code 3.1 as reflected in the Subsidiary Arrangements on 12 
February 1976.140  
 
Furthermore is stated that Iran’s decision was made in accordance with a bill passed 
by the Iranian Parliament in 2006 requiring withdrawal from the modified version of 
its Subsidiary Arrangements.  Iran’s claim of not being bound by the Revised Code 
3.1 is thus built on the fact that the modifications to its Subsidiary Arrangements from 
1976 were never ratified by its Parliament and the fact that the implementation of the 
modified version no longer is in line with domestic legislation. According to Iran the 
declaration of the Fordow facility therefore is in consistency with the obligations 
under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement, since the IAEA was 
informed of the new facility by Qom well in advance of the 180-day requirement 
contained in the 1976 text.141  
 
4.2.3 The position of the IAEA 
In a letter of response to Iran from the 30th March 2007 the IAEA urged Iran to 
reconsider the suspension of the Revised Code 3.1 as it was said to be contrary to the 
Board decision from 1992, in which the Board request all Member States to 
implement the modified version of the Subsidiary Arrangements. Iran was moreover 
informed that: 
 
…the modified text of Code 3.1 is now included in all Subsidiary Arrangements General Part in 
force with States that have Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements. Iran’s decision therefore is 
regrettable.142 
 
                                                
140 GOV/INF/2007/8, para.6, (italics added). Iran’s position was withheld at the latest BoG in March 
2010, see, INFCIRC/786 available at http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/index.shtml 
141 Statement by Iran at the IAEA BoG, November 2009, INFCIRC/799, p 2, repeated at the March 
2010 BoG, INFCIRC/786, p 5, http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/index.shtml 
142 The letter is attached to GOV/INF/2007/8, available at 
www.pmiran.at/sts2007/GOV%20INF%20Subsidiary%20arrangement.pdf www. 
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The former Director General of the IAEA, Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei has in a number 
of reports to the Board of Governors on the implementation of safeguards in Iran 
repeated that Iran’s suspension of the Revised Code 3.1 is inconsistent with its 
obligations under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguard Agreement.143 In his 
May 2007 report the Director General asserted that: 
 
In accordance with Article 39 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, agreed Subsidiary Arrangements 
cannot be modified unilaterally; nor is there a mechanism in the Safeguards Agreement for the 
suspension of provisions agreed to in Subsidiary Arrangements.144 
 
In March 2009 the Legal Advisor of the IAEA made a statement at the Board of 
Governors where he reiterated that “the implementation of the provisions of 
Subsidiary Arrangements can only be amended or suspended with the agreement of 
both parties to them”.145 The position of the IAEA is clearly that the Revised Code 3.1 
became mandatory to Iran through Iran’s letter of the 26th February 2003. The IAEA 
thus contests that Iran’s implementation of the Revised Code 3.1 between 2003 and 
2007 was voluntary or that a later internal Iranian law can repeal it.  
 
5. IRAN’S RELATION TO THE REVISED CODE 3.1 IN THE 
LIGHT OF INTERNATIONAL TREATY LAW 
 
To Be, or not to Be, Bound, 
That is the Question 146 
 
5.1 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) 
5.1.1 The Treaty on treaties; an introduction  
In order to formulate an opinion on whether or not Iran can be held, under 
international law, to be bound by the Revised Code 3.1 the analysis will take as point 
of departure the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The Vienna Convention 
constitutes the body of rules which determines how a treaty is defined, how it is 
                                                
143 GOV/2010/10 para.31, GOV 2009/74, para.17; GOV/2009/55, para.14; GOV/2008/59, para.9, 
GOV/2007/22, paras.12-14, available at http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/index.shtml 
144 GOV/2007/22, para.14  
145 Available at http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/file_download/162/Legal_Adviser_Iran.pdf. 
146 Inspired by Shakespeare’s Hamlet  
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concluded, amended, interpreted and terminated; and has therefore tellingly been 
called “the treaty on treaties”.147 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties was 
one of the first creations of the International Law Commission (ILC), having been 
established by the UN in 1947 for the purpose of promoting and codifying 
international law. The now forty-year-old Vienna Convention was drawn up in big 
parts after already well established customary international law on treaties. The 
Convention was adopted at the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties in 
Vienna in 1969 but did not enter into force until 1980.148 
 
5.1.2 Applicability of the Convention 
Little doubt remains on the question of the applicability of the Vienna Convention in 
areas that fall outside the exact limits drawn up by its text. The Vienna Convention is 
today widely, if not universally, recognized as constituting customary international 
law.149 The International Court of Justice has frequently reaffirmed the position of 
various of the provisions of the Convention as customary law and legal scholars 
around the world give an affirming opinion on the matter.150 The status of customary 
law is particularly clear for the provisions on interpretation, articles 31 and 32 VCLT, 
and was explicitly determined by the ICJ in the Botswana/Namibia case.151  
 
Since the Vienna Convention according to article 1 VCLT applies only between State-
actors, a “replica” was created in the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
between States and International Organisations or between International 
Organisations. The 1986 Convention has not yet entered into force but the treaty 
relationships it regulates are covered by the 1969 Convention, article 3 VCLT, in so 
far as the latter represents customary law.152 Thus, although the text of the 1969 
Convention indicates that it applies only to treaties concluded between States and 
                                                
147  Anthony Aust: Modern Treaty Law and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 
p. 6 
148 See the United Nations Treaty Collection on http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ParticipationStatus.aspx 
149 Ian Brownlie: Principles of Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 
580, Alan Boyle and Christine Chinkin: The Making of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), p. 190  
150 Anthony Aust: Modern Treaty Law and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 
pp. 12-13 
151 See Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia), ICJ Report 1999, p. 1045, para.18  
152Aust: Modern Treaty Law and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 400 
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despite the fact that it is non-retroactive and requires adoption by the States 
concerned, the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is applicable on the 
Safeguards Agreement concluded between Iran and the IAEA.153  
 
5.1.3 Premises for the analysis 
The analysis must necessarily be based on an interpretation of the “main” document, 
namely the Safeguards Agreement, which refers to the document Iran no longer 
implements in the way requested by IAEA, namely the Subsidiary Arrangements, 
Revised Code 3.1. Subsidiary Arrangements are not freestanding documents but on 
the contrary a part of the Safeguards Agreement, thought to enable the interpretation, 
and by that the fulfilment of the latter. Consequently the provisions of the Safeguards 
Agreement are those that should be under investigation, and specifically the provision 
on how changes to Subsidiary Arrangements can be made, entailed in article 39 of 
Iran’s Safeguards Agreement. Article 39 SA lays out the conditions for the 
establishment of a document that will interpret the provision on design information, as 
foreseen in article 42 SA and thus constitutes the legal prescription challenged by 
Iran. When analyzing the bilateral agreement between the IAEA and Iran it is lastly 
important to keep in mind the relationship to the NPT and how the normative 
structure and content of the “Mother-Treaty” has bearing upon the functioning of the 
Safeguards Agreement.  
 
5.2 Fundamental implications of becoming party to an international treaty 
5.2.1 Pacta sunt servanda and the subordinate role of domestic legislation 
Iran’s Safeguards Agreement has entered into force through ratification, which is one 
of several means foreseen in article 11 VCLT for a State to express its consent to be 
bound by a treaty.154 Iran is thus party to a bilateral treaty concluded with the IAEA.155 
                                                
153 Iran has neither ratified the Convention nor was the Safeguards Agreement concluded after 1980 
and the contracting Party is the IAEA, not a State, see article 1 and 4 VCLT, and the status of the 
VCLT on 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?&src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIII~1&chapter=23&T
emp=mtdsg3&lang=en 
154 Necessary for the entry into force of the Safeguards Agreement was that the consent to bound was 
notified to the IAEA, as it was the 15 May 1974, article 25 INCIRC/214 and article 24 VCLT 
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Consequently Iran is bound by the provisions of the Safeguards Agreement and must 
perform them in god faith, in accordance with the fundamental international principle 
pacta sunt servanda entailed in article 26 VCLT. From an international legal point of 
view, as made clear in article 27 VCLT, becoming party to a treaty furthermore has as 
consequence that a State is deprived of the possibility to invoke internal law as 
justification for a failure to perform in accordance with the treaty in force. The Iranian 
Parliament having passed a law suspending the implementation of the Revised Code 
3.1 can thus not in itself dissolve Iran’s international obligation to comply with its 
commitments under the Safeguards Agreement.  
 
Iran’s argumentation is however two-fold and implies that it was not the subsequent 
Iranian law alone that repealed the Revised Code 3.1 but the fact that it was not 
legally binding upon Iran from start. Although the IAEA has used the words 
“unilateral withdrawal” to describe Iran’s actions the critical question to analyze from 
the Vienna Convention is rather if the Revised Code 3.1 has at all been legally 
binding upon Iran.156 The argument employed by Iran in this regard is that the changes 
in their Subsidiary Arrangements require ratification. Reasonably the argument can 
only be understood either as a claim that these changes constitute an amendment of 
the Safeguards Agreement or that although the changes do not amount to an 
amendment they still require ratification.  
 
5.3 The amending of treaties  
5.3.1 Amendment procedure provided for in the Safeguards Agreement   
How a treaty should be amended is fully up to the parties and article 39 VCLT lays 
out the basic rule that “A treaty may be amended by agreement between the Parties”. 
Amendments will only be governed by the Convention if the treaty itself does not 
                                                                                                                                       
155 “Party” signifies that the treaty has entered into force and is legally binding for the State, this is to 
be compared to other formulations such as “Signatory” or “Contracting” which imply that the State is 
not yet legally bound by the treaty, see article 1 (g) VCLT and Aust: Modern Treaty Law and Practice 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 115  
156 Treaty provisions are seen as inseparable and the Vienna Convention does not provide any 
possibility to withdraw from only one part of the treaty, article 44.1 VCLT and neither do the 
provisions of the Safeguards Agreement, see above 4.2.2. Focusing on “withdrawal” would mean 
arguing around a withdrawal from the Safeguards Agreement itself, which however doesn’t appear 
fruitful since none of the parties has claimed anything the like.  
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provide an amendment mechanism. The Safeguards Agreement of Iran entails such a 
mechanism in article 24 SA. The difficulty therefore lies not in finding the applicable 
rules but in the classification of what in this case is an amendment. The changes to the 
rules regarding the provision of design information are of substantial significance, and 
could be held to constitute an amendment if it was not for the specific regulation in 
article 39 SA and 42 SA.  
 
According to article 42 SA the obligation to provide design information shall be 
specified in Subsidiary Arrangements and article 39 SA states that “The Subsidiary 
Arrangements may be extended or changed by agreement between the Government of 
Iran and the Agency without amendment of this agreement”. Being an integral part of 
the Subsidiary Arrangements, the modification of the Code 3.1, therefore can hardly 
be classified as an amendment of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement.  Remaining is then to 
investigate whether an interpretation of the Safeguards Agreement allows for 
ratification of Subsidiary Arrangements, without them being considered amendments.  
 
5.4 Interpretation of treaties  
5.4.1 General Principles of interpretation 
Reading the commentary of the International Law Commission to the Vienna 
Convention it becomes evident that there are a number of principles of international 
law that may be relevant for the interpretation of a treaty. International jurisprudence 
is also rich in reference to various national and international principles; of which 
some put the main emphasis on the text, some on intention and yet some on finality. 
With this background the ILC came to the conclusion that “…the interpretation of 
documents to some extent [is] an art, not an exact science”.157 Result of the work 
process of the ILC, the Vienna Convention attempts to include and to balance the 
diverging approaches; and has indeed by many been called a piece of art.  The general 
rule of interpretation as it was finally put down in article 31.1 of the Vienna 
Convention starts out by declaring that: 
 
                                                
157 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1996, Vol. II, p 218, available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/sessions/18/18sess.htm 
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A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith and in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 
 
Three elements are to be considered: the text, the context and the object and purpose 
of the treaty. In order to determine the words in its context guidance is to be found in 
article 31.2 and 31.3 of the Convention.  First however, there is some to be said about 
good faith and the object and purpose of treaties.   
 
5.4.1.1 Interpretation in good faith  
 
The principle of interpretation in good faith directly flows from the pacta sunt 
servanda principle in Article 26 VCLT and means in this regard that the provision of 
a treaty must be interpreted in a way that the result of their application does not turn 
out unreasonable or manifestly absurd.158 Iran’s interpretation of the Safeguards 
Agreement may not be manifestly absurd but what clearly can be said is that the 
IAEA from the day when Iran by letter accepted the application of the Revised Code 
3.1 has held Iran to be legally bound by it.159 The responsibility of clarifying its 
intentions of a voluntarily application should in this situation lie on Iran, since the 
position taken clearly differs from what has been normal IAEA practice.160 Not having 
done so makes the standpoint of the IAEA seem to be the one more in line with a 
reasonable result of an interpretation. The extent to which the principle of good faith 
in itself can create legally binding obligation is however not without question and the 
ICJ has stated that good faith “is not in itself a source of obligation where none would 
otherwise exist”.161   
 
5.4.1.2 Object and purpose of the Treaty 
 
Determining the object and purpose of a treaty is a complex undertaking and there 
may be not only one, but several coexisting in the treaty.162 The task is also given a 
secondary rang, meaning that what will be sought for primarily when interpreting a 
                                                
158 Aust: Modern Treaty Law and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 234 
159 See above under 4.2.2  
160 Rockwood: Legal Instruments Related to the Application of the Safeguards, IAEA/OPANAL 
Seminar, Jamaica, 1996, paragraph V 
161 See the Border and Transborder Armed Actions Case, ICJ Report 1988, at 105, paragraph 94, for a 
discussion see Jan Klabbers: The Concept of Treaty in International Law (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 1996), pp. 111-113 
162 Malgosia Fitzmaurice, “The Practical Workings of the Law of Treaties”, in Malcolm, D. Evans 
(ed.): International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 202 
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treaty is the ordinary meaning of the words in their context, and not an inherent 
finality embodied in the treaty. 163 One object and purpose however shared by most 
treaties is the maintenance of the balance of the rights and obligations created by the 
treaty.164 The teleological approach can thus serve as a tool for understanding the 
diverging character of international treaties and the different aims of particular treaty-
types. The Safeguards Agreement is a bilateral treaty between a State and an 
international organisation but has come to existence for the purpose of fulfilling the 
multilateral Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Therefore the 
object and purpose of the NPT is of importance also for the interpretation of the 
Safeguards Agreement.  
 
Multilateral treaties can be divided into law-making treaties and contract treaties.165 A 
law-making treaty provides the same rules for all its parties on a specific issue area. A 
contract treaty on the other hand attributes differentiated and reciprocal rights and 
obligations between the parties or between defined groups of parties to the treaty. The 
substantial difference between these two types of treaties lies within the internal 
relationship between the actors having committed to the rules of the treaty. In a law-
making treaty the breach by one of the parties will not affect the remaining parties’ 
obligation to perform in accordance with the treaty. The opposite can be said of a 
contract treaty, where the failure of one of the categories of parties to fulfil its 
commitments indeed affects the obligatory character of the other’s.166 Like most 
contracts found in private international law the non-compliance of the one side can be 
held to alter the binding force of the obligations of the other side’s.  
 
The NPT obviously has the character of a contract treaty and it may well be argued 
that possible breaches by the Nuclear Weapon States to the NPT in no way are 
without bearing on the interpretation of Non Nuclear Weapon States’ obligations 
                                                
163 When it comes to dealing with reservations to treaties defining object and purpose is crucial, see 
Aust: Modern Treaty Law and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 136 
164 Mark, E. Villiger: Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009), p. 427 
165 Ian Brownlie: Principles of Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 
p. 608 
166Joyner: International Law and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), pp. 10-11 
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under their respective Safeguards Agreements.167 Admittedly the exercise of 
determining if and at what moment such a situation might arise where Iran would no 
longer be obliged under the NPT is outside of what is possible in this report. The 
discussed however provides an eye-opener to the complexity of the issue and sheds a 
different light on the commitment of NWS to disarmament.168     
 
5.4.2 The relevance of the context for the interpretation of the terms of the text  
5.4.2.1 The terms of article 39 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement (article 31.1 VCLT) 
 
Giving primacy to a textual approach the International Law Commission presumed 
the text of a treaty to be the basic expression of the intention of the parties and 
consequently suggested that all treaty interpretation should start out from the terms of 
the text.169 The Safeguards Agreement of Iran states in article 39 that Iran’s Subsidiary 
Arrangements can be changed “by agreement between Iran and the Agency without 
amendment of this Agreement”.  As we have seen above, article 24 SA entails a 
procedure where amendments enter into force when the IAEA is notified that Iran’s 
statutory requirements have been fulfilled.170  
 
Using the wording “without amendment” in article 39 indicates that a different 
procedure for changing Subsidiary Arrangements is desired than the one chosen for 
amendments of the Safeguards Agreement.171 An a contrario interpretation would 
suggest that since amendments require ratification and Subsidiary Arrangements are 
expressly exempt from the provision on amendments, Iran, by ratifying the 
Safeguards Agreement, agreed to the fact that Subsidiary Arrangements could be 
changed without ratification.  
 
  
 
                                                
167 See Joyner remarks about NNWS obligations under the NPT, which can be transmitted to the 
obligations under Safeguards Agreements, p. 10 
168 For further discussion on the topic see ibid. at p. 66 f 
169 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1996, Vol. II, p. 220 
170 Through a referral to article 25 which states the indicated procedure for the entry into force of the 
Safeguards Agreement in itself, se above 4.2.2 
171 The Additional Protocol INFCIRC/540 is the best example of an amendment of the Safeguards 
Agreement, entering into force through a ratification procedure. As of December 2009 only 94 of the 
145 States with which the IAEA has bilateral Safeguards Agreements had brought the Additional 
Protocol into force, see http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sv.html 
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5.4.2.2 Relating agreements revealing the intension of the parties (article 31.2 VCLT) 
 
When establishing the context in which the terms of a treaty are employed article 31.2 
of the Vienna Convention declares that any “agreement relating to the treaty which 
was made between [..] the Parties in connection with the conclusion of treaty” shall be 
considered. Although concluded first in 1976, two years after the entry into force of 
the Safeguards Agreement, the original Subsidiary Arrangements between Iran and 
the IAEA was made “in connection” with the Safeguards Agreement. The conclusion 
of the Subsidiary Arrangements is a direct consequence of article 39 of Iran’s 
Safeguards Agreement and the way in which it was concluded provides guidance for 
the interpretation of the intention of the parties with regards to the terms employed in 
article 39 SA.  
 
Since the SA is silent on the procedure for both the entry into force and changing of 
Subsidiary Arrangements a conclusion could be that the same, non-specified, 
procedure would apply for both. In this regard an analogous interpretation gives that if 
Iran did not require ratification for the entry into force of the original version of its 
Subsidiary Arrangements it can be taken as an indication that such ratification neither 
is necessary for a modification of the same. If the other way round, this would suggest 
an agreement to the contrary, thus that ratification is required. At this moment the 
author of the paper cannot confirm whether it is the one or the other, but what has 
been elaborated is still illuminating as to possible approaches to the issue.  
 
5.4.2.3 Subsequent practice influencing the interpretation of the Safeguards 
Agreement (article 31.3 b VCLT) 
 
A most important element for the interpretation of a treaty is how the treaty has been 
applied and concretized by the parties after its entry into force. The Vienna 
Convention states in sub-paragraph b of article 31.3 that together with the context of a 
treaty shall be taken into account: 
 
Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the 
parties regarding its interpretation. 
 
As has been laid out above there exists an established IAEA practice to conclude and 
modify Subsidiary Arrangements by an exchange of letters. Safeguards Agreements 
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being separate bilateral treaties between the IAEA and a NNWS it would however be 
going too far to say that the general practice of the IAEA is directly determinate in the 
relationship between Iran and the IAEA.172  
 
Nonetheless, the IAEA practice has bearing on the IAEA/Iran relationship both in the 
sense that it shows us what is custom in these situations and that it can tell us 
something of the intentions of the parties. Iran, while consenting by letter to the 
Revised Code 3.1 in 2003 must have been well aware of the lengthily applied practice 
of the IAEA. Consequently Iran can be considered as having consented through its 
letter to become bound by the changes, in accordance with the IAEA practice. This 
opinion is built on the fact that in applying article 31.3 b VCLT it is not necessary to 
show that the contracting party has definitely engaged in the practice, only that the 
party has accepted it, even tacitly.173 In international media Iran has also been said to 
previously have modified its Subsidiary Arrangements through letter correspondence 
with the IAEA, but due to the confidential nature of these documents the statement is 
difficult to verify. 174  
 
5.4.2.4 General international law influencing the interpretation of the Safeguards 
Agreement (article 31.3 c VCLT) 
 
Sub-paragraph c of article 31.3 VCLT holds that the interpretation of a treaty shall 
comprise “relevant rules of international law “ applicable between the parties. The 
possibly relevant rules of international law in this case could be the 1992 decision of 
the IAEA Board of Governors to change the interpretation of the obligation to provide 
design information. The letter from the IAEA to Iran in response to Iran’s declaration 
that it would no longer apply the Revised Code 3.1 states that Iran’s decision is 
“contrary to the Board’s decision”. The letter thus seems to be saying that Iran is 
bound by the Revised Code 3.1 already upon the decisions of the Board of Governors. 
This would imply that the Board of Governors has the power to unilaterally modify 
individual NNWS Subsidiary Arrangements. Such a conclusion is quite contrary to 
express provisions of the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the IAEA and 
                                                
172 See Aust who explains that the practice should exist between the Parties, Modern Treaty Law and 
Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 241 
173 Aust: Modern Treaty Law and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 243 
174 See James M. Acton: Iran Violated International Obligations on Qom Facility, Carnegie 
Endowment For International Peace September 25, 2009. See also above at 4.2.2  
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Iran. Neither does such a standpoint have any support in the Statute of the IAEA or in 
IAEA practice.175  
 
The letter from the IAEA also puts emphasis on the fact that the revised Code 3.1 now 
is included in the Subsidiary Arrangements of all States having Comprehensive 
Safeguards Agreements in force. The pertinent question to ask is thus if a customary 
norm can be held to have evolved, containing the new interpretation of the obligation 
to provide design information. In that case Iran would be bound by the Revised Code 
3.1 irrespective of its own approval.176 This assumption follows from the basic feature 
of international law that there exists no hierarchy between custom and treaty-sources 
and that their relation consequently is governed by the general principle of lex 
posterior derogat priori.177  
 
Firstly the fulfilment of the general conditions, usus and opinio juris, for the existence 
of a customary norm would need to be ascertained. Not being rocket science, the 
evaluation of the possible formulation of customary rules requires extensive surveys 
of empirical facts, knowledge of State “attitudes”, as well as deliberation upon 
varying time-aspects.178  Secondly, the question is if, and to what extent, customary 
norms can change the content of treaties. The interrelation between customary and 
conventional rules and the ability of the former to affect the latter is seen as both 
complex and difficult to apply in practice.179 Prudence and a restrictive application has 
therefore been considered necessary when attempting such conclusions.180 Lastly, a 
plausible assumption is that most NNWS would strongly reject any trends in the 
                                                
175 Since the procedure for modifying Subsidiary Arrangements routinely includes an acceptance by the 
NNWS, transmitted by a written notification.  
176 The most well-known example is “new” content of article 27.3 of the UN Charter on voting rules in 
the Security Council, where the ICJ held in the Namibia case that due to the consequent practice of the 
SC the meaning of article 27 had changed, see Jan Klabbers: The Concept of Treaty in International 
Law, (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996), p. 91 
177 Antonio Cassese: International Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 154 
178 For an in depths consideration of the two criteria see Mark E. Villiger: Customary International 
Law and Treaties: A Manual on the Theory and Practice of the Interrelation of Sources, (The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 1997), pp. 29 f.  
179 Ibid. p. 218. See also Villiger: Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009), p. 16 for a discussion on the difference between 
subsequent practice, art. 31.3 b and customary law, art 31.3 c VCLT  
180 Boyle and Chinkin: The Making of International Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 
245; see however Villiger who puts into questions the presumption against a customary rule replacing a 
conventional rule, Villiger: Customary International Law and Treaties: A Manual on the Theory and 
Practice of the Interrelation of Sources, (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997), p. 218  
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direction of their bilateral agreements with the IAEA being modified without their 
express consent.   
 
5.5 Conclusions 
The International Law Commission made clear that the different parts of the general 
rule of interpretation embodied in article 31 VCLT should be seen as forming a single 
integrated unity, enabling, what they call, the process of interpretation.181 Placing the 
different aspects analyzed as blocks in the mentioned process and evaluating them in 
relation to each other, the conclusion can be drawn that the position of Iran is not in 
line with the Vienna Convention. Iran has since its decision to stop implementing the 
Revised Code 3.1 used a legalistic argumentation based on its unquestionable rights 
as a sovereign State to chose freely which approach to take in relation to international 
law.  
 
From an international legal perspective however, Iran’s position does not hold stand 
for closer scrutiny. While it is uncertain that the modified provisions on design 
information have become obligatory upon Iran through customary law, the Safeguards 
Agreement itself gives less room for doubt as to the legal character of the Revised 
Code 3.1. Both the express terms, in their context, employed in the Safeguards 
Agreement and what can be read out as the intention of the parties from their 
behaviour, point in the same direction. The treaty does not specify how changes to the 
Subsidiary Arrangements are to be made (only that they are not to be made in the 
same way as amendments). Without a subsequent practice on the area, or if clear that 
the practice does not apply in the specific relationship between Iran and the IAEA, a 
different outcome cannot be excluded. However existing, and in any case tacitly 
consented to (if not even taken part in establishing), Iran can be held to have intended 
to modify its Subsidiary Arrangements without ratification, in accordance with IAEA 
practice. 
 
In sum, there are strong grounds for the view that Iran is bound by the modifications 
to its Safeguards Agreement, as agreed to by written notification to the IAEA the 26 
                                                
181 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1996, Vol. II, p 220 
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February 2003. Bearing in mind Neil MacCormick’s well-known words about the 
relativity of truth182 the conclusion concerning the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant is 
consequently that Iran should have declared the facility at a much earlier stage, in 
effect already when the decision was taken to build the facility.183    
6. COMPLETION 
6.1 Strengthening the safeguards system through internal measures? 
The conflict between Iran and the IAEA over the implementation of the Revised Code 
3.1 has been going on for several years. At the latest Board of Governors in March 
2010, the issue was one of the central points of discussion and both sides raised the 
same arguments as have been raised before. The discovery of the Fordow facility has 
however increased the tone of urgency by those members of the Board of Governors 
who want Iran to submit to their interpretation of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement.184 
Iran’s announcements of the countries plans to build up to ten additional nuclear 
plants also shows that the issue is not likely to lose in actuality in the near future.185 
According to a letter from Iran to the IAEA in connection with the March Board of 
Governors any future nuclear plants will be declared “in due time”, in accordance 
with Iran’s original Subsidiary Arrangements of 1976.186 Iran does thus not show any 
intentions of giving way to the pressure put up by the IAEA Board of Governors on 
this point.  
 
From a general point of view the question of the legal character and the compliance-
potential of documents established in connection to international treaties is clearly 
                                                
182 For a discussion of relative and absolute truth and the possibilities of finding either of them see Neil 
MacCormick: Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), p.  271  
183 Not to be forgotten is also that if  (which according to the latest report, GOV/2010/10, para. 15, 
seems plausible) the decision to build the Fordow facility was taken before the 29 March 2007, (which 
was the date when Iran notified the IAEA of its reversal to the 1976 text) Iran was in any case obliged 
to report the decisions, due to its “voluntary” application of the Revised Code 3.1 
184 See the resolution adopted by vote at the November BoG GOV/2009/82, available at 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2009/gov2009-82.pdf 
185 See e.g. the article by William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, A Defiant Iran Vows to Build Nuclear 
Plants, New York Times, 29 November 2009, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/30/world/middleeast/30iran.html 
186 See the Communication dated 1 March 2010 received from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran to the Agency regarding the implementation of safeguards in Iran, INFCIRC/786, p 5, 
available at http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/iran_timeline7.shtml 
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crucial for the functioning of international law as a mode of regulating State 
interaction. Whatever conclusion one comes to concerning the legal status of the 
Revised Code 3.1, the current situation is problematic, and has to be understood in 
relation to the non-proliferation regime as such. There have been many voices raised 
on the lack of efficiency, and the incapability of the non-proliferation regime to 
achieve the objective of preventing NNWS from acquiring nuclear weapons.187  
Former Head of Department of Safeguards (1999-2005) Pierre Goldschmidt is 
however of the opinion that with sufficient political will, there are things that can be 
done to significantly strengthen the non-proliferation regime. Goldschmidt talks about 
procedural changes that do not require modification of the NPT or the Safeguards 
Agreements; thus emphasising the possibility of internal changes to the safeguards 
system.  
 
With regards to the provisions on design information the proposed changes are 
directed at the way Iran’s behaviour has previously been dealt with in the Board of 
Governors. In this view Goldschmidt put forth that the Board of Governors should 
adopt a resolution clearly declaring that Iran’s refusal to implement the Revised Code 
3.1 constitutes a case of non-compliance under article XII.C of the IAEA Statute. 
According to Goldschmidt this would be necessary, not only to put pressure on Iran 
but also in order to avoid establishing “wrong precedents”.188  
 
During the Board of Governors in November 2009, following the revelation of the 
Fordow facility, the Board did indeed adopt a resolution concerning the Revised Code 
3.1, and Iran was reported to the Security Council.189 The concern that other NNWS 
will follow Iran’s example is valid and arguably has to be taken into the equation. 
Although the text of the resolution remains ambiguous, the reporting of Iran to the 
Security Council secures the possibilities of the IAEA to take the same measures in 
future similar situations. 190  When it comes to the specific case of Iran it can however 
                                                
187 Goldschmidt: Concrete Steps to Improve the Nonproliferation Regime, Carnegie Endowment For 
International Peace, No. 100, April 2009, p. 3 
188 Ibid. 
189 GOV/2009/82 
190 The resolution does not expressly apply the term “non-compliance” or refer to article XII.C but 
instead “notes with serious concern” that “ Iran’s failure to notify the Agency of the new facility until 
September 2009 is inconsistent with its obligations under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its 
Safeguards Agreement” Furthermore Iran is “urged” to apply the modified Code 3.1 and it is 
“affirmed” that Iran’s decision  “does not contribute to the building of confidence”, GOV/2009/82, p 2 
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be deemed questionable to what extent an additional referral to the Security Council 
on this matter will have a desirable effect. Recent developments do in any case not 
point in that direction. 
6.2 The power of legitimacy among nations191  
6.2.1 The idea of legitimacy as a force in international society  
Material for a somewhat broader reflection upon the non-proliferation regime can be 
found in the increased discussion about legitimacy in international relations.192 Focus 
has been put not only on defining what legitimacy actually represents but also what 
the consequences are of legitimate respectively illegitimate systems of international 
regulation. Returning to the words of Thomas Franck, legitimate rules exert a 
compliance pull of their own and are thus more likely to be observed than rules not 
endowed with legitimacy.193  This rimes well with the assumption that the idea of 
legitimacy affects State’s behaviour and functions as both a constraining and an 
enabling force in international society.194  
 
According to another of the main figures of legitimacy theory, Max Weber, a system 
is legitimate when those who are subject to the rules of the system perceive it to be 
legitimate.195 Considering the continuous claims of being victim to “double standards” 
and arbitrary application of IAEA-rules this is clearly not the case with Iran.196 Having 
been in part a strategy for winning public support197 (with varying results) Iran’s 
assertions cannot be easily dismissed. The fact that both South Korea (2004) and 
Egypt (2005) were not found by the Board of Governors to be in non-compliance, and 
                                                
191 The title of the essential book by Thomas Franck: The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990)  
192 Ian Clark: Legitimacy in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 1 
193 Thomas Franck: The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1990), p. 24  
194 Clark: Legitimacy in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 246 
195 Ibid. p. 18 
196 One example being President Ahmadinejad’s speech before the Sixtieth Session of the UN General 
Assembly, 17 September 2005, available at 
http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/60/statements/iran050917eng.pdf 
197 George Perkovich: Dealing With Iran: The Power of Legitimacy, Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, Policy Outlook No. 50, October 2009, available at 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=23971 
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consequently not reported to the Security Council in situations clearly constituting 
breaches of their respective Safeguards Agreements underpin Iran’s accusations.198  
 
Critics argue that Iran has been subject to an institutional escalation that cannot be 
explained objectively by difference in fact to other cases, and is unsupported by 
previous precedents.199 Recognizing the problematic Pierre Goldschmidt deems it of 
crucial importance for the IAEA Board of Governors to acknowledge its past 
inconsistent actions and to take appropriate corrective measures. Goldschmidt is quite 
clear when he says that a failure to do so could seriously undermine the credibility of 
the safeguards regime.200  
 
6.2.2 Components in the legitimacy equation  
A distinction has been made between formal and substantial legitimacy, meaning that 
a set of rules that have come to being in a formally correct manner can still be 
illegitimate because they do not correspond to underlying values such as fairness or 
justice.201 Coherent and consistent application, transparency, and objective decision-
making procedures are variables that have an impact. As for the non-proliferation 
regime criticism is directed primarily towards the IAEA Board of Governors. The 
composition and the way the Board of Governors is made up, in combination with the 
large power it occupies, raises concerns that the decisions taken in this forum are 
susceptible to manipulation and might be serving political agendas of a few, rather 
than accurately representing the international community on the nuclear arena.202  
 
The US-Indian “Global Partnership” where the United States has decided to transfer 
civilian nuclear equipment and technology to a Non-NPT State who is in possession 
of nuclear weapons also seriously brigs into question alleged commitments to non-
                                                
198 Goldschmidt: Exposing Nuclear Non-compliance, Global Politics and Strategy, Vol. 51, No. 1, 
February-March 2009, p 149 
199 Joyner: International Law and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,(Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), p. 53 
200 Goldschmidt: Concrete Steps to Improve the Nonproliferation Regime, Carnegie Endowment For 
International Peace, No. 100, April 2009, p. 13 
201 Clark: Legitimacy in International Society, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 19 
202 Joyner: International Law and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), p. 24 
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proliferation.203 If not a direct violation of article III.2 NPT,204 the US acknowledging 
a State that has refused to participate in the multilateral cooperation on halting the 
spread of nuclear weapons, and that has in fact acquired such weapons, without doubt 
goes against the spirit of the NPT.205 One of the main reasons for NNWS, such as Iran, 
to give up the right to nuclear weapons was exactly that access to civilian nuclear 
power would follow in return.206 If such access is obtainable in any case, the logic of 
renouncing to nuclear weapons is quite considerably reduced.  
 
6.2.3 Remembering the flip side of the non-proliferation deal  
Notwithstanding what has been said above, the most important aspect of legitimacy 
lies perhaps within the unequal distribution of rights and obligations embedded in the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty itself. A minority of States have the legal right to possess 
nuclear weapons and the rest do not. In a system of independent sovereign States this 
is far from a given state of reality. Considering that the final goal of the NPT is to 
prevent nuclear war indefinitely the “unjust” structure of the NPT can make sense 
only if it is a means to attain the common goal. Nuclear Weapon States’ commitment 
to disarmament is therefore momentous. The obligation for NWS to disarm 
themselves from nuclear weapons is formulated vaguely, and article VI of the NPT 
does not specify when it should happen.207 This however does not make the 
commitment less real, or its fulfilment less important.208 Only by putting equal 
                                                
203 The agreement between India and the US was signed into law by President Bush on December 18, 
2006, and entered into force by mid December 2008, after it had been approved by both the US 
Congress and Senate, see Paul K. Kerr: CRS: U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for 
Congress, 5 November 2009, available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/20815/crs.html 
204 Article III.2 prohibits the transfer of nuclear material or equipment to NNWS not under 
comprehensive safeguards. The US argument is that the term “Non-Nuclear Weapon States” used in 
the NPT only refers to NNWS who are party to the NPT (which India isn’t). One can also observe that 
India is no longer a NNWS, due to the fact that it never signed the NPT and therefore legitimately 
could produce nuclear weapons.  
205Interview with Lawrence Scheinman: Scheinman: New U.S.-India Agreement Undercuts U.S. 
Allegiance to Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Council on Foreign Relations, 3 November 2005, 
available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/9149/scheinman.html 
206 See above 2.2.2 on the “grand bargain” of the NPT 
207 Article VI of the NPT reads “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in 
good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to 
nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and compete disarmament under strict and effective 
international control”. Available at 
www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc140.pdf 
208 During both the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conference article VI NPT was given substance 
through politically binding consensus resolutions, interpreting its content and putting forth practical 
steps for advancing disarmament, see Jean du Preez: The 2005 NPT Review Conference: Can It Meet 
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emphasis on Nuclear- and Non-Nuclear Weapon State’s respective contributions to a 
nuclear free world can the legitimacy of the non-proliferation regime be ascertained. 
As for the fiercest critics of Iran, the United States, it is clear that promises in this 
regard in previous years have been all but respected.209 When it comes to the other 
Nuclear Weapon States they may not have ignored article VI of the NPT as bluntly as 
the US, but the fact remains that 40 years after the entry into force of the NPT none of 
the NWS has undertaken serious attempts towards total disarmament.210 Non-
proliferation scholar Jean du Preez puts the finger on the question of legitimacy when 
he asks the following question:  
 
If the nuclear-weapon states are allowed to cherry-pick which commitments they consider 
applicable, then why are non-nuclear-weapon states refused the same privilege? 
 
Iran possibly developing nuclear weapons is very serious. A nuclear Iran is the last 
thing the world wants and Iran’s disregard of its safeguards obligations needs to be 
addressed effectively and swiftly. If this is to be done in a credible manner the 
attempts must however include more than the regular finger pointing and 
condemnation of Iran. As obvious as it sounds it still should to be said: Nuclear 
Weapon States have to start living up to their part of the deal.  
 
Following the Bush administrations total rejection of nuclear disarmament all eyes are 
placed on the new American leadership. In April 2009 President Obama held an 
ambitious speech in Prague were he said:   
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
the Nuclear Challenge? Arms Control Today, April 2005, available at 
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_04/duPreez  
209 As examples of US unwillingness under the Bush administration can be mentioned the refusal to 
ratify the CTBT (ban on nuclear testing) and to participate in negotiations to forbid the production of 
fissile material used in nuclear weapons, and importantly the increased role for national security 
nuclear weapons were given in the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, see Joyner: International Law and 
the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 62 
210 Disarmament with the words of the NPT preamble being “ [..] the cessation of the manufacture of 
nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all the[eir] existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national 
arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and 
complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”, see Joyner: International Law 
and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 66 
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So today, I state clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and 
security of a world without nuclear weapons.211 
  
President Obama’s words filled many hearts with joy and raised hopes for change. It 
now remains to be seen to what extent these words can be realized through concrete 
policy decisions.212  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
211 Obama Prague Speech On Nuclear Weapons: Full Text, (5 April 2009), Huffington Post. Available 
at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/04/05/obama-prague-speech-on-nu_n_183219.html 
212 On April 8 a new START treaty was signed with Russian and as the New York Times puts it, 
Obama’s 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (a document all Presidents redefine according to their nuclear 
policy) entails “dramatic” reduction of nuclear stockpiles a halt to further development of new nuclear 
weapons. At the same time the budget for maintaining and updating the existing (in the future reduced) 
nuclear arsenal will increase as dramatically (amounting to 5 billion dollars), see David E. Sanger and 
Thom Shanker: White House Is Rethinking Nuclear Policy, New York Times, 28 February 2010, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/01/us/politics/01nuke.html 
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